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Letter from the Editor 
 On behalf of the entire editorial board, I am honored 
to present the newest issue of the Penn History Review. 
Since 1991, the Penn History Review has been dedicated 
to promoting the study of history amongst undergraduate 
students. Since its founding, PHR has published exceptional 
historical scholarship written by students at the University of 
Pennsylvania as well as schools across the United States. Our 
spring 2021 edition exemplifies the diversity of study within 
our field. It includes articles that explore dynamic topics such 
as municipal politics in Civil War America, nineteenth century 
American railroad accounting, Mexican foreign policy, and 
the Ptolemaic state. These pieces embody the core values 
of our publication: curiosity, critical thinking, a dedication 
to research, and most importantly, a passion for history. Our 
entire editorial team deeply enjoyed working with the authors 
and editing these papers. We hope that  you will find them 
thought-provoking and enjoy reading them as much as we did!
 Our first piece, “Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban 
America: a Comparative Study of NYC and Philadelphia 
Politics” is authored by Justin Greenman. Excerpted from a 
longer piece, he analyzes the municipal politics of the two 
cities during the American Civil War, particularly with regard 
to the two mayors: Fernando Wood and Alexander Henry. 
 In the next article “American Railroad Accounting 
Practices in the Nineteenth Century,” William Zimmermann 
analyzes the emergence of modern accounting practices 
in nineteenth century railroads.  The author claims that 
the industry’s changing standards can be viewed as a 
proxy for and bellwether for American business writ large.
 In the third paper, “Mexico’s Cuban Connection: 
An Exception or Example of the United States’ Ardent Anti 
Communism,” Victoria Saeki-Serna of Rice University 
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analyzes US-Mexico relations during the Cold War. The 
author claims that Mexico took a significantly softer line 
towards Havana than the US would have liked, but the US 
overlooked it in the interest of Mexican domestic stability.
 Our final piece, “Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration 
and the Weak State Problem”, comes from Alan Clingan of the 
University of Maryland, College Park.   The author, writing 
on a subject area rarely covered in this journal, discusses the 
relationship between the ruling, ethnically Greek, Ptolemaic 
dynasty and the native Egyptians in antiquity. The author 
argues that the early Ptolemaic state, in particular, revolved 
around a weak state that relied on native Egyptian collaborators.
 Additionally, this issue includes a sample of abstracts 
submitted by seniors at Penn who undertook the challenge of 
writing honors theses for the History Department. In doing so, 
PHR hopes to promote additional research and scholarship 
in the field of history by offering its readership a preview 
of this fascinating variety of topics. Congratulations to all 
of the senior honors students who achieved this impressive 
accomplishment. We encourage other history students 
to also embark on this incredibly rewarding endeavour. 
 The editorial board would also like to thank a number 
of people without whom this edition of the PHR would not 
have been possible. Our publication only exists thanks to 
the generous support of the Penn History Department who 
continues to support and fund us each year. In particular, we 
are extremely grateful to Dr. Siyen Fei, the Undergraduate 
Chair of the department, and Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the Associate 
Director of Undergraduate Studies. They have both offered 
invaluable guidance and encouragement throughout the 
editing and publishing processes. The dedication they have 
for both their students and field of study is an inspiration. In 
addition, we would like to thank the faculty members at Penn 
and other universities who promoted our publication, as well 
as all of the students who submitted papers for consideration. 
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This edition would not exist without your support. Thank 
you as well to our contributing authors, who worked 
patiently and diligently to refine their articles for publication. 
 Finally, I would like to thank our editors for their 
exceptionally hard work on this issue of the Penn History 
Review.  I would especially like to recognize the contributions 
of our three graduating seniors: Lorenza Colagrossi, Logan 
Nantais, and Spencer Swanson. Their passion for history and 
dedication over the years have continued to make the PHR 
a platform for remarkable scholarship. It has been a truly 
enjoyable experience to work with each of them throughout my 
time on the board. We will miss having them in our editorial 
family but are confident that they will go on to do great things. 
 In particular, I would like to thank Lorenza Colagrossi, 
our incredible Editor-in-Chief Emeritus. I am deeply indebted 
to her and have had the great privilege of learning from her 
and studying alongside her. She is brilliant, hard-working, 
and kind. Lorenza, thank you for the constant guidance, 
support, and dedication to everything you do. Now that 
you are moving on, I have no doubt that you will bring 
these attributes with you to your next great endeavor. It has 
truly been an honor to work with you. PHR will eternally 
be a stronger publication because it had you as a leader, 
particularly through these trying times. Last year, when 
campus closed down and we were forced online, you did not 
miss a beat and PHR continued to publish. At the same time, I 
would like to recognize three new editors we were especially 
fortunate to have added to the board this semester, Nicholas 
Williams, Hannah De Oliveira and Keyvan Farmanfarmaian. 
They have already made a positive impact on our journal. 
 This year marks PHR’s 30th anniversary as a 
publication. I am honored to be the Editor-in-Chief during 
this milestone year and deeply grateful to all those who 
have kept PHR going into its fourth decade and who I 
am sure will keeping it going for many more: the Penn 
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History Department for providing funding and support, 
the countless authors and editors who have worked on past 
editions and, of course, my predecessors as Editor-in-Chief.
 Congratulations again to all of the authors and editors 
who participated in this edition of the Penn History Review!
                                                                    
Eden Vance
Editor-in-Chief
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Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban Amer-
ica: A Comparative Study of New York 
City and philadelphia Politics
Justin Greenman
Introduction:
 The decades before the American Civil War would be a 
period of great change for America’s two largest cities, New York 
City and Philadelphia. At the turn of the 19th century, New York 
City was still socially homogenous, with few immigrants and a 
uniform, simple economy. But, as its economic and social power 
grew with the development of new industries and the growth 
of interstate commerce, immigration to the city skyrocketed. 
Immigrants flooded the physically expanding city from New 
England, from the countryside of upstate New York, and from 
overseas, to the point where by 1860 it had 813,660 residents. 
Thus, by 1860 New York City was America’s financial and social 
capital, the “capital of capital” as historian John Strausbaugh 
put it.1 1860 Philadelphia had a population of 565,529, behind 
only London, Paris, and New York City. Like New York City and 
most northern metropolises, its immigrants were primarily Irish 
and German (16.7 and 7.5 percent in Philadelphia, respectively.) 
However, unlike New York City, it had a vibrant native-born 
citizenry, whether anti-slavery heirs of the City of Brotherly 
Love’s Quaker founders, members of its 400 churches and nearly 
one thousand organized lodges, clubs, and benefit associations, 
or Southern businessmen moving North for greater economic 
opportunities.2 For these long-time Philadelphia residents, the 
Civil War, and the resulting political and social changes to their 
city, would be a time of reckoning for their long-held beliefs. 
 As national centers of commerce and society, New York 
City and Philadelphia are crucial to understanding the national 
Penn History Review     11 
Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America
political and ideological changes and movements that occurred 
during the Civil War. Throughout the war, both cities would 
serve as microcosms for the political and ideological changes 
that befell the rest of the Union. In the historical memory and 
common knowledge of New York City and Philadelphia during 
the war, the two cities have acquired contrasting perceptions. 
New York City, in large part thanks to its well-documented 
draft riots, is perceived as a disloyal, racist city. Philadelphia, 
in large part thanks to its colonial legacy and lack of similar 
riots or anti-Lincoln actions, is perceived as a loyal and pro-war 
city. In reality, however, the truth about each city’s loyalty and 
disloyalty is somewhere between the reputations given to them 
by the passage of time. Neither New York City nor Philadelphia 
fit into the perfect picture of the “loyal city” or “disloyal city” 
that they have been placed into by popular memory. Both cities 
faced pitched electoral clashes that could have easily taken their 
cities in different political directions, and no political outcome 
in either city was preordained.  
 Comparatively studying New York City and 
Philadelphia revealed the fascinating differences with which 
politically active citizens, especially elected officials and 
party leaders, positioned themselves in relation to the war 
effort. Yet, one facet that united political actors divided by 
different viewpoints and residing in different cities was their 
use of definitions of loyalty and disloyalty. Analyzing either 
city through definitions of loyalty and disloyalty is a rare 
historiographical occurrence; nevertheless, conceptions of 
loyalty and disloyalty are crucial for this study. In a conflict as 
divisive as the Civil War, both cities were split between many 
vocal factions that argued they were the only ones truly loyal 
to the nation while their opponents were just disloyal agitators. 
They also sought to control and alter situations when the 
disloyalty label was directed at them. Thus, this work will be a 
critical reinterpretation of how we, now over 155 years since the 
end of the Civil War, see those who practiced politics in New 
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York City and Philadelphia during the conflict. 
 Even those actors already given some scholarly 
treatment deserve to be recontextualized within the framework 
of loyalty and disloyalty. The New York City or Philadelphia 
leader who receives the most scholarly treatment is Fernando 
Wood. Twice elected mayor of New York City, including serving 
as its first war-time mayor, and later a congressman, Wood is 
the focus of two well-researched books, various articles, and 
plays an integral role in most stories of New York City during 
the war. While most of the works repeat facts and arguments 
about his life story, there is a notable disagreement that this 
thesis will relitigate and seek to solve. Was Wood a disloyal, 
political opportunist masking or deploying his opposition to 
the war at different times when it was politically advantageous, 
or was he a loyal leader who stuck by his principles even forced 
to adapt to changing circumstances like everyone else? All in 
all, through Wood’s winding wartime career while there were 
shades of the latter, he was a politician first, willing to sacrifice 
his party and principles, and in one case his state’s safety, for 
political gain. Other political actors of different degrees of 
notoriety will also be recontextualized within this question, and 
while they all were political opportunists to varying degrees, 
none were as overtly duplicitous as Wood was. 
 Beyond Wood, both cities are also filled with partisan 
actors seeking to utilize the Civil War to push forward their 
vision for their city. While there are too many to cover in detail, 
this work will examine many based on their connections to 
the different intraparty factions of both cities. The politics of 
both cities were defined by constant party feuds that at times 
allowed for political and electoral success, but most often led 
to disaster. The New York City Democratic Party alone had 
three powerful factions, Tammany Hall, Mozart Hall, and the 
McKeon Democracy, all of whom will receive their due. New 
York City Republicans were divided between a more moderate 
faction led by New York Times editor Henry Raymond and a 
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more radical faction led by New York Tribune editor Horace 
Greeley. At different points in the war, these factions stood 
for different positions and achieved different levels of success. 
For instance, while Raymond’s faction originally opposed 
President Lincoln’s policies, by war’s end they were amongst 
his most powerful backers. Greeley’s faction helped deliver him 
the 1860 Republican nomination and then soured on him as 
the war progressed. The reason for this shift will be examined, 
occurring based on the evolving popularity of Lincoln and his 
wartime policies, and what they meant for this intraparty power 
struggle. Philadelphia, on the other hand, was less defined by 
interparty or intraparty feuds. Rather, it was characterized more 
by a divide between a bipartisan, pro-war consensus under 
Alexander Henry and out-of-power Democrats and Republicans 
who wanted a seat at the table but were never popular enough 
to receive one. The reason for this composition of Philadelphia 
politics will be examined. All in all, Henry’s desire for 
bipartisanship and consensus was successful, in large part due 
to a healthy use of police power, which allowed Philadelphia to 
avoid most of the divisiveness and bloodshed that befell New 
York City. 
 Besides political leaders, and their parties and coalitions, 
there are other key avenues to understand the intersections of 
the cities. For example, both cities had a rich heterogeneous 
mix of newspapers that were important for the politicization 
of those who led and were led alike. In 19th century America, 
newspapers were crucial prognosticators and disseminators of 
political thought, allowing everyday citizens, regardless of their 
education or political knowledge, to glean their own personal 
views from the opinions of their favorite newspaper. As Edward 
Dicey, a British journalist visiting America during the Civil 
War, put it, “In truth, the most remarkable feature about 
the American press is its quantity rather than its quality. The 
American might be defined as a newspaper-reading animal…
Reading is so universal an acquirement here, that a far larger, 
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and also a far lower, class reads the newspapers than is the 
case with us.”3 The papers, whether affiliated with politically 
independent or with a party or faction, still hoped to influence 
political parties and leaders. New York City especially was 
dominated by an ideological battle between its three most 
influential newspapers: Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune, 
Henry Raymond’s New York Times, and Fernando Wood’s New 
York Daily News. Their constant battle to define themselves 
as loyal, and their competitors (and thus their competitors’ 
readers) as disloyal would demonstrate the simmering tension 
between New York City’s ideological and ethnic communities. 
Due to their ties to a party faction, these newspapers 
successfully captured the views of their faction and its 
struggles, or outright refusal, to adjust as the national political 
circumstances changed. On the other hand, Philadelphia’s 
papers, while ideological, had few connections to organized 
politics, and thus politically evolved with much of the country 
as the war progressed. 
 This section, of a larger work encompassing the years 
1859-1865, covers 1859-1861, examining how the quick 
rhetorical shifting, by both parties, from opposition to civil 
war to full-throated pro-war, anti-South oratory obscured 
real political divisions about loyalty. While in the end loyalty 
as constructed as supporting Lincoln and the war effort fully 
would win out in both cities over loyalty as constructed as 
supporting a party or a pre-war national construct, it was by 
no means an easy decision for either city and for those who 
led them. At times, the first construction would even be the 
most unpopular view of loyalty, especially during periods 
of Democratic control and when the Union war effort was 
struggling the most. By the end of the war, while many of the 
political leaders and factions evolved with their city’s residents 
towards the first definition of loyalty, others would refuse to 
evolve despite great pressure, to varying degrees of negative 
electoral and personal consequences. In that case, the differences 
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between the cities plays a deciding role, where in New York 
City those who sought bipartisanship failed completely, 
while their counterparts in Philadelphia succeeded. Likewise, 
while Democrats virtually disappeared from elected office in 
Philadelphia, in New York City they ruled for most of the war, 
even after a significant portion of their base rioted in the streets. 
 In truth, throughout the war there was no simple 
answer about what loyalty and disloyalty meant. Many in both 
parties would vehemently resist any definition but their own. 
While I know that my work will not lead to a simple answer 
about the roles of loyalty and disloyalty in political action and 
discourse, I hope that my use of the best of the scholarship 
combined with primary sources to fill its gaping holes will help 
conclude that one’s loyalty and disloyalty could not be judged 
by one’s partisan identification or political allies. It especially 
cannot be judged by one’s rhetoric, which was often vague at 
best and deceitful of one’s true intentions at worst. In fact, if 
there is one conclusion that this paper easily makes, it is that 
there were no universally agreed upon, or even mostly agreed 
upon, definitions of what constituted loyalty and disloyalty, 
only subjective opinions altered by time and animated by 
politics. 
New York City and Philadelphia: The Early Days of the Split
  For New York City and Philadelphia Democrats 
and Republicans leaders alike, April 12th, 1861 would mark 
a turning point from their pre-war attitudes towards the 
Union, secession, and other contentious issues. Democrats 
and Republicans, and their powerful political and media 
leaders, would immediately walk back much of the criticism 
they leveled at President Lincoln and the possibility of war. 
Both sides would go to great lengths to trumpet their loyalty 
to the war effort, seeking to outflank their opponents as the 
most loyal. It appeared that the coming of war would bring 
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an end to the discordant Northern politics of the 1850s and 
usher in a new era of bipartisan cooperation. But, these public 
demonstrations of agreement would be both short-lived and 
ultimately unsuccessful attempts at unity. By the end of the 
year, interparty and intraparty rivalries would resume, with 
efforts by politicians in both parties to denigrate others as 
disloyal to the war effort when it was still broadly popular 
and to highlight their own ideological principles to their 
supporters once it was not. These divisions in New York City 
and Philadelphia would be magnified by the contentious and 
divisive city elections in 1861, setting the stage for an even 
more contentious and divisive 1862.
 However, to best understand where both parties and 
their heterogeneous factions would end up by 1862, it is 
necessary first to determine where they started. For both cities, 
the years immediately preceding the war were marked by 
political turbulence. Old political alliances and ideologies were 
chaotically rejected and replaced, as different groups and ideas 
jockeyed for power. The result would be the transformation of 
Philadelphia into a one-party city, a party defined by support 
for the Union over traditional party lines, though with a 
sizable minority of Democrats and Republicans opposing 
the consensus, and of New York City into a city politically 
partitioned into three nearly equal parts. Thus, even though 
both cities entered the war in relatively similar ideological 
positions, they would, thanks to these wartime dynamics, exit 
the year completely dissimilar. 
 For a city north of the Mason-Dixon line, pre-war 
Philadelphia was in many ways a Southern city. With its 
manufacturing capital greater than the combination of 11 
states that would become the Confederacy, it received great 
economic investment from wealthy Southerners. These 
Southerners did not just send money to Philadelphia; in fact, 
many Southerners married into Philadelphia families and 
directed their manufacturing empires from within the city. They 
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then employed poor whites, often immigrants, and allied with 
them politically by focusing on a supposedly shared hatred for 
the city’s growing free black population. For decades before 
the war, these ties to the South manifested in clear voting 
preferences for Southern economic interests and led to massive 
Democratic electoral success in the city. In the city’s 1856 
presidential election, Republican John C. Fremont received 
11% of the vote, with the Democrats procuring a majority, and 
its burgeoning Know-Nothing Party forced to suppress many 
of its anti-slavery supporters.4 As Charles Godfrey Leland, a 
Philadelphia satirist, put it, “everything Southern was exalted 
and worshipped.”5
 One example of something Southern exalted in 
Philadelphia was fear and, in many, overt hatred towards the 
city’s free blacks. As previously established, some of the hatred 
felt by the city’s workers towards black residents was promoted 
by direct propaganda from the city’s Southern business leaders. 
Yet, most of the hatred felt by Philadelphians of all walks of 
life towards free blacks came from their unmistakable presence, 
constituting four percent of Philadelphia’s population. Though 
on the surface small, they were the largest black community in 
the North, and second only to Baltimore’s. Furthermore, they 
disproportionately lived in wards closest to the city’s major 
political and social institutions and often worked in economic 
sectors like menial labor and domestic work that kept them 
in poverty and near the city elite.6 Thus it is clear that in 
Philadelphia, the controversy over black rights in city society, or 
lack thereof, was more omnipresent than seemingly far-fetched 
fears of secession or unrelatable issues like Bleeding Kansas. 
 Yet in pre-war Philadelphia, free blacks were more than 
just a nuisance or something to fear; they were also a direct 
target of restrictive political measures. Blacks were stuck in 
low-level menial labor or domestic work because of economic 
restrictions passed by Southern-allied Democrats and supported 
by the white worker base. Employment in new factories built 
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by Southerners was closed to blacks, membership in trade 
groups was barred, and Democratic state legislatures mandated 
separate schools for blacks long before Plessy vs. Ferguson.7 
While New York City has a more developed reputation for 
racism during the era, contemporary abolitionists actually 
thought Philadelphia was worse. The abolitionist William 
Wells Brown said that in Philadelphia, “Colorphobia is more 
rampant here than in the pro-slavery, negro-hating city of New 
York.”8 Frederick Douglass went even further, saying “There 
is not perhaps anywhere to be found a city in which prejudice 
against color is more rampant than in Philadelphia...The whole 
aspect of city usage at this point is mean, contemptible, and 
barbarous…”9 Unfortunately, even the war would not alter 
many of these obstructions and the city’s views of blacks would 
alter the rhetoric and policies of even more or less sympathetic 
political leadership. 
 The rise to power of an opposition party after such 
a Democratic landslide in 1856 illustrated how quickly new 
alliances could be created, be successful, and then immediately 
face the possibility of dissolution.  It may be surprising that 
out of this virulently pro-Democrat, pro-South, and anti-black 
political structure, the Democratic Party would be displaced 
just two years later by an upstart party that stood against most 
of its core tenets. But, in reality, this displacement marked a 
major political realignment that befell much of the North, 
but especially Philadelphia. In the wake of Bleeding Kansas in 
1855 and the Dred Scott Supreme Court case in 1857, new 
political coalitions were formed across the North to oppose 
the Democratic Party and its increasing agreement with the 
Southern ideology on slavery. Compromised of disaffected 
Democrats, former Whigs, nativists, and Free Soilers, these 
coalitions often struggled to succeed because of disagreements 
over the extent to which  growing anti-slavery and anti-
immigration ideologies should be emphasized. Those in 
Philadelphia came together in 1857 to form a new political 
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party, the Peoples Party. 
 The Peoples Party avoided the fate that befell other anti-
Democrat coalitions by promising to ignore both slavery and 
nativism. They would only support popular sovereignty, not 
even abolition in new territories, and nativists would have to 
be satisfied with a lip-service plank of “Protection of American 
Labor against the Pauper Labor of Europe.”10 Rather than 
focus on what divided them, they focused on what they agreed 
on: the party portrayed Democrats as the aggressors on the 
question of slavery in an appeal to those who may nominally 
be Democrats, but still worried that slavery was bringing the 
country to the brink of Civil War.11 The Democratic Party 
was still a strong force, castigating the Peoples Party as the 
“‘Mulatto’ Party, offspring of miscegenation between the 
Americans and ‘Black Republicans.’” One Democratic speaker 
at an 1858 rally even argued that if the Peoples Party won, the 
state should go with the South before Republicans destroyed 
the national confederacy.12 Yet, in 1858 the new party would 
notch its first major electoral success, defeating the incumbent 
Democratic mayor and replacing him with one of their own, 
Alexander Henry. Therefore, it is clear that while Philadelphia 
had many Southern inclinations, they would not remain fully 
intact as the Civil War approached. 
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 Alexander Henry, a wealthy young lawyer, hoped his 
term could avoid controversy while using his power to focus 
on his main legislative priority: improving the city’s public 
transportation. That his main policy goal was completely 
divorced from national politics reveals the tightrope that the 
Peoples Party sought to walk.  Despite his victory, however, 
Henry’s influence and power over the city was tenuous at best. 
At any moment, the fragile alliance that brought him to power 
could collapse over internal divisions, allowing the Democratic 
Party to regain its usual power. Furthermore, the Peoples 
Party cannot be equated with the Republican Party; a separate 
political organization used the Republican name to push Henry 
and his allies towards a more candid antislavery position.13 His 
balancing act became more difficult after John Brown’s raid 
the next year. The raid would greatly polarize Philadelphia, 
convincing the city’s previously quiet abolitionists to schedule 
a public meeting at Independence Hall on the day of his 
execution. The audience at the meeting was divided between 
Alexander Henry, unknown author and 
date.
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abolitionists, black residents, and Southern sympathizers, and 
order was only ensured by the 120 policemen sent by Mayor 
Henry to attend the event. He would later use the police again 
to bar abolitionists from meeting Brown’s body when it passed 
through the city after his death and to stop Democrats from 
attacking New York abolitionist George Curtis as he lectured at 
the Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Fair.14
 Henry’s use of the city’s police force to maintain calm 
between divided factions would later become a hallmark 
of his administration and of the power of the Philadelphia 
mayoralty. The roots of this power actually came from a 
recent development in Philadelphia’s political and geographic 
evolution. In 1854, Philadelphia consolidated its outlying 
communities. Primarily intended to enlarge Philadelphia’s tax 
base, this consolidation also realigned political power around its 
executive and away from its city council. One key example of 
the increased power of the Philadelphia mayoralty was regarding 
the police. Now, each ward had its own police station under the 
supervision of a central station at City Hall, which the mayor 
controlled. Henry’s predecessors had already tested out the 
new police powers, first with the  nativist and prohibitionist 
Robert Conrad suppressing Sunday newspapers and liquor 
sales.15 Out of this recent expansion would come Henry’s key 
mechanism for guiding his city through its darkest hours. The 
fact that wartime New York City had no such power vested in 
its mayor would one day restrain the leadership efforts of its 
non-Democratic leadership. 
 Despite trying to evenly utilize force against and on 
behalf of all political factions, Henry’s measures were wildly 
unpopular with much of the city in 1859 and into 1860. 
Democratic opponents saw him as a closet abolitionist who 
should have instead suppressed the anti-slavery meetings. Henry 
seemingly supported this argument by joining Curtis on stage at 
his lecture as a symbol of municipal authority and fairness. He 
was quickly rebuked in a 16-5 vote by the city’s Select Council, 
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and about a third of the city’s medical students from the South 
withdrew from their schools in protest. His political allies were 
not much better at supporting him, with many joining the 
city’s Republican Party rather than continue suppressing their 
views on issues surrounding slavery.16 Pushed in from both 
parties, Henry’s power nearly evaporated. Based on precinct 
returns from the May 1860 election for the mayoral race, A.K. 
McClure, a prominent Philadelphia Republican politician 
during the war and an ally of Henry, admitted years later that 
Henry was only re-elected because of falsified election returns, 
though there is no direct evidence of voter fraud or of Henry’s 
knowledge of any falsification.17 Perhaps to show he was still 
moderate, or out of legitimate ideological desires, Henry would 
end up supporting the Constitution Unionist, John Bell, over 
the Republican, Abraham Lincoln, in the 1860 presidential 
election. However, the latter’s large victory in the city, a sign 
of its continued drift away from the Democratic Party, would 
serve as a warning. For the mayor, his power as 1861 began was 
a far cry from the mandate he was seemingly given just three 
years earlier.
 Democrats in the city also refused to give him or 
the Peoples Party room to reassure the city that they wanted 
reconciliation following Lincoln’s election and the secession 
of Southern states. On January 17th, Democrats held a mass 
meeting in which they supported Southern secession. One 
of the keynote speakers was William Bradford Reed, perhaps 
at the pinnacle of his power.  Born into Philadelphia’s social 
elite, his grandfather served as Pennsylvania’s governor during 
the Revolutionary War, even as he was accused of directly 
communicating with King George III to betray his erstwhile 
friend George Washington. Originally an Anti-Mason and later 
a Whig, William Reed quickly irritated friend and foe alike. 
As historian Joanna Cowden put it in a very unsympathetic 
biography, “Attributing self-serving motives to those who 
opposed him, he measured their purity against his own 
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and found them wanting.” By 1856, he had abandoned the 
collapsing Whig Party, allying with many of his former friends 
and enemies by joining the Democratic Party.18
 Before the switch, Reed was no Southern apologist like 
most in the Philadelphia Democratic Party. In his biography 
of his grandfather, Reed highlighted his grandfather’s support 
for Pennsylvania’s 1780 gradual abolition law as a proud 
accomplishment for his state.19 However, once he joined 
the Democratic Party, Reed abandoned such praise. Reed 
would reject congressional measures imposing limits on slave 
ownership in the territories. He would also align himself with 
a new home-state ally, the pro-Southern James Buchanan, for 
his presidential campaign. Reed would help Buchanan bring 
former Whigs like himself into the fold, portraying Buchanan 
as a moderate who would “save the country from the fanatical 
abolition which has always done wrong to us…”20 After 
his victory, Buchanan would reward Reed by making him 
Minister to China, a prestigious diplomatic post that solidified 
Reed’s prominence and power within the city’s Democratic 
establishment. Reed would serve in this position until returning 
home in 1859 to defend Buchanan’s policies. 
 Thus, his 1861 speech was a homecoming for Reed, 
and an opportunity for him to stake out an ideological vision 
for the Philadelphia Democratic Party. He and the other 
speakers, Reed claimed, were there to discuss “conciliation and 
none other.” Lincoln’s election had unleashed a “fierce and 
feverish spirit” that could only be prevented if the South was 
placated.  To appease the South, he urged the city’s Democrats 
to adopt a course of neutrality to orchestrate a settlement 
between those “whose fanaticism has precipitated this misery 
upon us” and their “brethren in the South, whose wrongs we 
feel as our own.”21 Though Reed did not directly advocate for 
secession, his advocacy of neutrality and later support for the 
Confederate cause over the Union cause led to that distinction 
being forgotten in the years ahead. But at the time, his speech 
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provoked relatively little controversy, as most city residents also 
wanted conciliation. 
 Philadelphia was a city struggling with many competing 
impulses in the years before the war. In many ways, it was 
a Southern city on par with many below the Mason-Dixon 
line. Its economy was closely allied with that of the South, its 
political opinions, demonstrated by the overwhelming support 
for Democratic candidates and positions, mirrored those of the 
South, and its unfortunate attitudes and treatment towards its 
black residents, mirrored the economic and social restrictions 
free blacks faced in the South. At the same time, antipathy 
began to develop against the Democratic Party, culminating 
in the election of Alexander Henry as Mayor. Still, there was 
no clear break, and Henry struggled throughout his first term 
to politically coexist between Southern allies and the growing 
Republican Party wanting stricter opposition. Henry also 
struggled to utilize a new feature of his position, control of 
the police. Furthermore, Democrats still held sway in the 
city, as seen by the popular speech of William Reed. A break 
would come, but it would take an event as catastrophic as the 
attack on Fort Sumter for Henry and his allies to gain an edge 
politically over their opponents and for Henry’s police-heavy 
strategy to prove effective. 
 New York City was also greatly divided politically in 
the lead up to the Civil War, and, like Philadelphia, residents 
faced the question about how close to align their city to the 
South. Wealthy New Yorkers, predominantly Democrats after 
the collapse of the Whig Party, had a vested economic interest 
in the South. New York City, more so than Philadelphia, was a 
part of a global trading network, and the most common good 
it unloaded in the decades before the war was Southern cotton. 
Cotton, of course, required slaves, and as the price of slaves 
skyrocketed, New York City banks extended credit to Southern 
plantations in exchange for continued access to the cotton 
market. Thus, New York City, as opposed to Philadelphia, was 
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explicitly complicit in slavery.22 Plus, it was an open secret that 
despite its nationwide ban in 1808, New York City continued 
as a place to import slaves from Africa. In fact, a city newspaper 
estimated in 1865 that between 1859 and 1860 alone, 85 ships 
had arrived in New York from Africa. 
 The views of the city on slavery were not all on one 
side of the debate though; in reality, New York City was on 
two opposing tracks when it came to slavery. Slaves had been 
officially manumitted in the city in 1827, a day that saw parades 
throughout the city, though mostly with only black residents 
participating. It also was home to prominent abolitionists, 
like Lewis Tappan, who served as a part of the Underground 
Railroad, and was the birthplace of the first black newspaper 
in the United States, Freedom’s Journal. Yet even Tappan was a 
major Northern trader of Southern cotton. Thus, while New 
York City was likely, as one historian later called it, the North’s 
most pro-South, anti-abolition city, it had an undercurrent of 
dissent and contradictions that would be tested throughout the 
Civil War.23
 As part of a national party, New York Democrats were 
also asked to swallow any misgivings they had about Southern 
priorities like slavery and free trade because those in the North 
could only win and influence national policy by courting and 
winning in the Solid South.24 Thus began a divisive internal 
party debate about how accommodating to be, and three 
camps were formed. “Hards” were parrots of Southern rhetoric, 
arguing the Union had to fully accommodate Southern 
expansionist desires. “Softs” advocated for popular sovereignty, 
a system devised by Illinois’ Stephen Douglas that allowed 
territories to choose for themselves if they wanted to slavery. 
Those who refused most or any accommodations with the 
South or slavery were “Barnburners,” though most Barnburners 
eventually fled to other parties or swallowed their misgivings 
for the sake of electoral success and joined one of the other two 
factions. While other state and local Democratic parties across 
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the North combusted under the weight of the party’s divisive 
policies of the 1850s, New York City’s was unique in that all 
these cleavages would mostly last throughout the war, though 
the factions took different names.25
 Though he was not the cause of the divisions, perhaps 
no one embodied these internal divisions better than Fernando 
Wood. At the start of the war, Wood was a veteran New York 
City politician in his third nonconsecutive term as mayor. He 
was also a local, state, and national Democratic power broker 
who tried to maintain influence as the city, and his party, 
careened through crisis after crisis. All in all, the one constant of 
Wood’s political power was that it was never constant. In part 
this was because Wood had generally chosen no ideological side 
in the great debate over accommodation to the South; he was 
neither a Hard nor a Soft. In 1849 he allied with the Softs in 
exchange for being the party’s nominee the next year, though 
he lost because he refused to endorse the Compromise of 1850 
as most other Softs did.26 When he finally won the mayoralty 
in 1854, he quickly alienated his supporters within the party 
with his patronage choices and public desire to be named Vice 
President in 1856. After failing to achieve that position, Wood 
had his term shortened by a year by Democrats to allow for 
a new election as soon as possible, with the explicit goal of 
replacing him.27 
 All this hostility resulted in Wood being voted out 
of office in an 1857 landslide thanks to an unprecedented 
fusion of the Know-Nothing and Republican parties with 
the anti-Wood members of the Democratic Party behind one 
candidate.28 This anti-Wood coalition was primarily composed 
of members of Tammany Hall, the city’s Democratic machine 
for much of the century. Wood nominally controlled the 
machine during his two terms, but after his loss Tammany Hall 
replaced one of Wood’s close allies, Gideon Tucker, as a sachem 
and forced Wood out as Grand Sachem. Rather than try again 
to regain control of the city’s existing Democratic organization, 
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Wood decided to form his own political organization within 
the Democratic Party. Wood had been somewhat of a political 
kingmaker before by virtue of being Mayor, but most of his 
efforts were futile. For instance, his attempts in 1855 to form an 
alliance with Barnburner Democrats did not come to fruition 
as both they and Tammany Hall were happy to have them leave 
the party.29 Up until that point, even with the party’s internal 
divisions, patronage, platforms, and candidates were almost 
universally determined by unelected leaders of Tammany Hall 
and not by elected officials like Wood. 
 But Wood sought, even in defeat, to make himself 
the decider. He would form Mozart Hall in 1858 to directly 
challenge Tammany Hall “until it opened its doors” to his 
appointments.30 Wood’s first major success was not political, 
but in print. He and his brother bought a failing newspaper 
called the New York Daily News, and quickly turned it into a 
well-read mouthpiece for Mozart Hall.31 Throughout this time 
period, newspapers were often the chief mouthpiece for political 
parties and actors to present their ideas and positions to voters, 
to attack their opponents, and rally their supporters to their 
side. As will be discussed later, this allowed newspaper editors to 
possess a great deal of political leverage and wield great political 
capital; but, the same held true for elected officials too. Wood 
knew that a newspaper supporting Mozart Hall would greatly 
increase his reach and impact in city politics. As a supporter 
articulated in a letter shortly before the Woods bought the 
New York Daily News, “What strikes you of the project? In 
case of your approval I would undertake it at once & provide 
the necessary materials & force - editorially & otherwise - to 
make it worthy of democratic patronage & second to none 
of its contemporaries in point of spirit…” For Wood and his 
new backers, a newspaper was a crucial tool to regain their lost 
influence.32
 The problem for Wood, besides the trouble of trying to 
supplant an organization with a history and tradition of success 
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for decades, was that he had no ideological base of support. 
Wood likely underestimated how his constant evolutions 
had alienated most political allies and overestimated their 
willingness to defect from Tammany too. For instance veteran 
city naval leader Prosper Wetmore declined to ally with Wood 
in the 1860 elections, saying the offer Wood proffered was 
beneath his age and experience.33 Thus, Wood charted a new 
path towards being a kingmaker: identity politics among the 
city’s Irish. This was not the only strategy he employed though; 
for instance, he had used John Brown’s Harpers Ferry raid 
that year to great effect as supposed evidence of the dangers of 
Republican rule.34 
 Wood had always pandered to the city’s Irish 
community, somewhat ironic since he had joined a local 
nativist group in an attempt to coalesce more support for his 
1854 run.35 Although their poverty in Ireland and desire for 
American prosperity may have led them towards Republican 
free labor ideology, they resented Republican alliances with 
nativists.36 Since the mass immigration of Irish began in the 
1840s, the Democratic Party had been their political home. 
But, after forming Mozart Hall, Wood would especially echo 
their rhetoric. He was a vocal opponent of prohibition, seen by 
many Irish immigrants at the time as a nativist talking point.37 
He repeatedly denigrated his opposition as beholden to “British 
stockjobbers,” a clear ploy for Anglophobic Irish sentiment.38 
But perhaps most importantly, he played on Irish fears of 
free black people as the Southerners did in Philadelphia and 
throughout the North, convincing them of future economic 
and social turmoil from greater black rights. Wood’s appeals 
to the Irish would also serve to fill the ranks of leadership in 
Mozart Hall since most of the defecting Tammany leaders, like 
Charles Daly, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, were Irish 
themselves.39
 Tammany Hall made a concerted effort leading up to 
the 1859 mayoral election to court Wood’s Irish base, promising 
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them the share of patronage that had originally prompted Wood 
to form Mozart Hall. But Tammany Hall was still an imperfect 
messenger for Irish interests, choosing to nominate William 
Havemeyer, a German businessman, over the Irish community’s 
and Mozart Hall’s preferred candidate, William Kennedy, an 
Irish merchant. Havemeyer, and his candidate for the city’s 
Corporation Attorney, Samuel Tilden, called themselves “Fifth 
Avenue Democrats” based on their residence within the city’s 
upper economic echelon anchored at the city’s Fifth Avenue. 
They saw their wealth and social presence within the city as an 
asset, but most immigrants saw it as something else. Wood’s 
mouthpiece, the New York Daily News, repeatedly referred to 
Fifth Avenue Democrats “as a kid-glove, scented, silk stocking, 
poodle-headed, degenerate aristocracy.” They were also accused 
of not being Democrats, having supported the Free-Soil wing of 
the party in the prior decade.40
 Displeased with Tammany Hall’s decision, Wood 
declared his candidacy, which he was not previously planning to 
do. Originally running against the coalition that had defeated 
him in 1857, his candidacy was aided by the Republican Party’s 
decision to nominate their own candidate. Their nominee, 
George Opdyke, hoped to appeal to independents and former 
Democrats upset by the Party’s pro-Southern stances. However, 
the Republicans were still too weak, and ended up siphoning 
enough votes from Havemeyer that Wood would shock many 
by winning the mayoralty again by a comfortable margin. 
Disgusted, Tilden would blame the “ignorant Irish” for their 
defeat, further driving the Irish away from Tammany Hall and 
that faction’s increasingly wealthy shift.41 All of a sudden, Wood 
was once again a power player in city party politics, and those 
who once attacked him and kicked him out were now singing 
his praises. A. Oakley Hall, a former Whig elected official and 
a decade later a Tammany Hall-backed mayor, wrote Wood 
that November to thank him for his “olive branch and to know 
that you bear no malice for the certainly objectionable language 
30     Justin Greenman
Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America
displayed by me…which is now heartily withdrawn.”42 
 The topsy-turvy political odyssey of Fernando Wood 
leading up to his surprising re-election as Mayor of New York 
City is possibly the best encapsulation of how his political 
power and ideals fluctuated. Wood’s primary goal, clearly, was 
to acquire and maintain power. To do so, Wood had no qualms 
about allying himself with different sides of the intraparty 
feud that consumed Democrats in the 1840s and 1850s. 
When he alienated too many allies in a quixotic bid for the 
vice presidency and lost the mayoralty in 1857, Wood pressed 
on, forming a rival Democratic faction to compete against 
his long-standing benefactors. With this new faction, Mozart 
Hall, Wood sought to encapsulate the pro-Southern ideology 
within the Democratic Party and capture the Irish immigrant 
demographic that was gaining more political influence every 
year in the city. This electoral strategy proved successful, 
demonstrating the popularity of his opinions and power of his 
constituents; yet, it also represented severe miscalculations by 
his old allies in Tammany Hall, their first of many in the years 
of the Civil War. 
 But Wood wanted more than the political comeback he 
had surprisingly achieved; he still wanted to be a national power 
player. Defeated, Tammany Hall wanted their power back and 
control of their city again. In pursuit of their feud, Wood and 
Tammany Hall would foster great national conflict within the 
Democratic Party at their party convention in 1860. In their 
desires for party supremacy, they would refuse to compromise 
on a presidential nominee, driving the Democratic Party into 
geographic factions that ran two separate campaigns. United, 
the Democratic Party may have won the 1860 presidential 
election, especially since Lincoln was loathed by much of the 
country; divided, they stood no chance against an emboldened 
Republican Party. Therefore, while it may be too simple to say 
the Tammany Hall-Mozart Hall feud was entirely responsible 
for the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, it 
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unavoidably played a devastating role. 
 Wood was what his biographer Jerome Mushkat would 
call New York City’s first “prototypical modern municipal 
leader, a professional politician seeking to get, keep, maintain, 
and expand power.”43 Already established as not content with 
the mayoralty, as his predecessors were, he initially hoped to 
be nominated for President at the 1860 Democratic National 
Convention in Charleston, a long-shot bid quickly quashed 
when the national party recognized Tammany Hall, not Mozart 
Hall, as the New York Democratic delegation. Yet Wood 
decided to travel to Charleston anyway, subsidizing the travel 
expenses of his allies if they protested Mozart Hall’s exclusion. 
Knowing that his Irish base had little national influence, Wood 
focused more on highlighting his shared political interests 
with the South. As previously established,Wood employed this 
strategy in his 1859 mayoral campaign with success, and in 
the leadup to the 1860 party convention he doubled down on 
that strategy.  His public letters with Virginia Governor Henry 
Wise supporting his state’s execution of John Brown sought to 
demonstrate his allegiance to the South and its political wishes, 
and made him the Southern delegates’ favorite candidate for 
Vice President, with many willing to lobby on his behalf. For 
example, Fred Aiken, the secretary of the 1860 Democratic 
convention and another Northerner with Southern sympathies, 
pledged to “use my best ability to affect the public mind of 
the South still more favorably in your behalf ” so Wood would 
become Vice President.44  
 Wood now hoped to be nominated as Vice President 
for John C. Breckinridge, President Buchanan’s sitting Vice 
President, who Wood called “a live & ambitious man, with a 
clear excellent & geographic status” to advance his candidacy.45 
But Breckinridge, and his alliance with Southern “ultras,” best 
known for their support for secession over the past decade, 
made him anathema to much of the North. Tammany Hall 
publicly backed Stephen Douglas, whose popular sovereignty 
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was increasingly anathema to much of the South. Wood, 
perhaps, could have helped convince his Southern allies to 
support Douglas as their standard-bearer. However, Wood 
refused, publicly calling Douglas the “bob-tailed pony from 
Illinois.”46 Tammany Hall would not compromise either, 
supporting a resolution to mandate two-thirds of the delegates 
endorse the nominee. The goal of the resolution was to prevent 
a Southern candidate from winning a simple majority without 
any Northern support, but the plan backfired when Stephen 
Douglas was unable to reach two-thirds as well. 
 After 57 failed ballots the convention was postponed, 
and a second convention was called for Baltimore. An attempt 
by Douglas to withdraw for a candidate capable of winning 
Northern and Southern delegates when the Democrats met 
again was rejected by Tammany Hall. With no hope of winning, 
Breckinridge allies left the convention and nominated him 
on a separate ticket, creating two rival Democratic campaigns 
for the 1860 presidential election. Wood tried to work with 
the two tickets to fuse in states where the Republicans would 
win otherwise, but his efforts mostly failed. Lincoln would 
be elected by a narrow plurality achieved by winning states 
that Democrats, if united, would have otherwise won.47 
While Wood’s more sympathetic biographer would wholly 
blame Tammany, Wood’s other biographer, the generally 
unsympathetic Samuel Pleasants, would wholly blame Wood. 
This historiographical discrepancy shows how one’s view of 
Wood clouds assigning blame for the Democratic debacle.48 
Nevertheless, both sides of the New York Democratic divide 
were principally responsible for the party’s split and loss because 
they chose candidates that had no chance of winning and 
refused to abandon them when this became clear.
Penn History Review     33 
Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America
 Once Lincoln was elected, Wood faced new and 
political challenges more dire than his fading national fortunes. 
As mayor of New York City, his first major challenge in 1861 
was deciding how to respond to the growing calls from his city’s 
business community to forge some compromise to preserve 
the Union and the city’s economic relationship with the South. 
New York City’s business community was generally supportive 
of Republican protectionist measures versus Democrat free 
trade, but they worried that President Lincoln would stifle trade 
with their biggest market, the South.49 Wood struggled to allay 
their concerns; this tension would manifest most clearly before 
the war in Fernando Wood’s infamous “Free City” speech. In 
this speech, Wood advocated that New York City secede from 
the state of New York and pledge neutrality in the inevitable 
upcoming war between North and South. This speech would 
share some similarities to William Reed’s previously discussed 
“The National Game. Three Outs and One Run.” Drawing de-
picting the four candidates of the 1860 United States presidential 
election (L to R): John Bell, Stephen Douglas, John C. Breckin-
ridge, and Abraham Lincoln.
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speech from the same winter. First, Wood argued that New 
York City must stand “with our aggrieved brethren of the 
slaves states” who they owe “friendly relations and common 
sympathy.” Second, Wood argued that a free city status would 
finally sever New York City from the wrongs of the state 
leaders (who he claimed were more dangerous than Southern 
secessionists) and attain security and prosperity. Finally, Wood 
qualified his pronouncement, saying that no violence should be 
utilized to help the city secede, but it should be done peacefully 
once war began.50
 What is most surprising about Wood’s speech is how 
little notice it received at the moment. Partially this was the 
result of few thinking a free city would be accomplished; in 
fact, other than reported discussions with “certain wise men” 
of the merchant community at Wood’s residence, no tangible 
legislative or executive actions occurred.51 Yet this lack of 
coverage may be due to a contemporary perception that the 
speech was not as dubious as it appeared. Many biographers 
of Wood, in fact, argue that his Free City speech was not 
a controversial political manifesto, like Reed’s, but simply 
either a “trial balloon” to see what rhetoric was permissible at 
that unique moment of history or a simple continuation of 
New York’s downstate-upstate feud.52 Feuds regarding “home 
rule” for New York City, how much control the city should 
have independent of state oversight, were constant. This 
intrastate tension flared every time new taxes were debated 
or new regulations were proposed, every time legislative 
reapportionment was necessary, and especially every time that 
political patronage was doled out. Wood’s three terms as mayor 
were defined by a rivalry between New York City and the 
rest of the state that, even today, often transcends party lines. 
Therefore, Wood’s speech is often described as little more than 
perhaps an ill-timed continuation of this conflict, and not an 
accurate reflection of his ideological attitudes.
 However, this argument is dubious since this would not 
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be the end of Wood’s questionable actions and rhetoric towards 
the South in the months before the war. His prior Thanksgiving 
proclamation urged citizens to pray that Republicans stop 
violating “the federal compact.”53 He issued a formal apology 
in January to the Governor of Georgia when New York state 
authorities found 25 muskets were heading south to aid the 
rebellion.54 His brother even demanded “total acquiescence in 
all Southern demands.”55 Some of Wood’s allies and base were 
even secession apologists. At a December 15th meeting, some 
Democrats passed a resolution extending “heartfelt sympathy” 
to Southerners “engaged in the holy cause of American liberty 
and trying to hold back the avalanche of Britishism…”56 It 
seemed that Wood and his allies would be a constant thorn in 
the side of Unionists until reconciliation was achieved.  
 As Wood ignited controversy and division, the city’s 
Republican Party sought to resolve its own internal divisions. 
For the decade before Wood’s controversial speech, parties in 
opposition to the Democratic majority in New York City would 
be too divided or controversial to reap the benefits of these 
divisions. By 1860, what had originally been a loose union 
of people united only by their opposition to Democrats was 
now a formalized Republican Party, but like Democrats, the 
Republicans had their own factions. The party was divided by 
a debate about whether to lean more towards its Whig Party 
roots or its Free-Soil Party roots. The former wanted a greater 
focus on economic issues like tariffs or infrastructure, hallmarks 
of the Whig ethos, and less on the South and slavery, the issues 
that destroyed the Whig Party. The latter, some of whom were 
once Democrats, wanted the focus on slavery and Southern 
expansionism. 
 This divide was often correlated with newspaper 
consumption. Whigs, who favored accommodation with Know-
Nothings and former Democrats, read Horace Greeley’s New 
York Tribune. Those who wanted the party wholly Whiggish 
read Henry Raymond’s New York Times. What saved these 
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factions from destroying the national party as Democrats did 
was that they all agreed to work for Abraham Lincoln’s election, 
even though many had originally supported New York’s own, 
William Seward, especially the Raymond faction. Lincoln 
winning New York and defeating the Democratic candidates 
nationwide was more important to both than settling intraparty 
scores.57 That does not mean the Raymond faction was 
happy; in fact, in a bitter New York Times article reflecting 
on the convention, the paper referred to Lincoln’s backers as 
“recusants” and thought so little of Lincoln that they referred to 
him as “Abram Lincoln.”58
 The rivalry between Raymond and Greeley was not just 
ideological, it was also personal. Raymond used to work under 
Greeley and for his New York Tribune but left after he became 
fed up with Greeley’s public embrace of social experiments like 
utopian socialism. Not only did he start his own competing 
paper, the New York Times, but he stole more than a dozen 
workers from Greeley, who for decades afterwards continuously 
referred to Raymond as “the Little Villain.” For the next two 
decades, their papers would bitterly compete for economic 
supremacy in the city, with Greeley’s high-strung editorial style 
and greater political radicalism keeping him ahead of Raymond 
for much of that time. Politically, however, Greeley was less 
successful against his nemesis. In 1854, both sought the Whig 
nomination for the lieutenant governorship of New York, with 
Raymond winning thanks to the backing of William Seward. 
Greeley, of course, would get the last pre-war laugh against 
Seward in that regard, though both Raymond and Greeley 
continued to jockey, as we will see unsuccessfully, in the years 
after.59
 The secession crisis brought the schism back as both 
party’s factions presented contrasting proposals for how to 
proceed, making it all but impossible to wholeheartedly attack 
Wood and his free city speech. Thurlow Weed, a close ally of 
Seward and Raymond, proposed that secession be averted by 
calling for a national convention that would constitutionally 
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enshrine the Missouri Compromise and the Compromise 
of 1850. While this proposal was seeming to limit some 
westward extension, it would have led to the unstated result of 
permanently protecting slavery in the Southern states.60 Horace 
Greeley and his allies vehemently rejected Weed’s proposal, 
saying that accommodation would delegitimize the entire 
antislavery stand. Greeley asked all New York City Republican 
Congressmen to go on record favoring “prompt and energetic 
enforcement of all the laws of the general government” as the 
way to ensure “the safety of the country” and “the preservation 
of the Union.” Though they rejected Greeley’s proclamation, 
none explicitly endorsed Weed’s proposals either.61 Once the 
war began, it would become common for New York City 
Republicans to paper over this resistance to aggression and their 
support for some accommodations. Yet in due time, desires for 
accommodation would return with a vengeance at the war’s 
climax.  
 Clearly, in the years before the Civil War internal 
disputes dominated both the Republican and Democratic 
parties of New York City. It has already been established 
that the Tammany Hall-Mozart Hall feud even had national 
consequences, aiding in the election of Abraham Lincoln 
and weakening the influence of Mayor Wood. His actions 
after the election of Lincoln, especially his Free City speech, 
caused further damage to his power. Though the clash between 
Republican coalitions did not have the same negative national 
consequences, in part because both sides went out of their way 
to accommodate the nomination of Lincoln and work towards 
his election, that does not mean the divide was any less severe. 
Its Whiggish wing, embodied by Henry Raymond and the 
New York Times and its Free Soiler wing, embodied by Horace 
Greeley and the New York Tribune, disagreed mightily over 
the direction the party should take regarding what issues to 
prioritize, what policies to support, and what base of political 
support they should cultivate. 
 Both Philadelphia and New York, already established as, 
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despite their political diversity, broadly sympathetic to Southern 
attitudes and positions,changed their rhetoric dramatically with 
the attack on Fort Sumter April 12th, 1861. In Philadelphia, 
excited crowds began peacefully roaming the streets to debate 
the latest reports from the South and exclaim their glee at the 
prospect of war. Quickly however, these gatherings became 
more sinister in behavior. According to the Philadelphia Public 
Ledger, originally an anti-slavery newspaper that under new 
ownership became virulently pro-Confederate until it was 
sold in 1864, “everyone who hinted any sympathy with the 
secession was made to make an unequivocal stand.” Some, like 
an intoxicated man who in a drunken stupor made the mistake 
of declaring himself a Southern sympathizer, went unharmed 
after leading “three cheers for the thirty United States.”62 After 
a local newspaper published the names and addresses of several 
wealthy Southerners, these crowds marched to their homes, 
demanding shows of patriotism. When one of the Southerners, 
Colonel Robert Patterson, refused, his windows were smashed. 
Others deemed disloyal took refuge in the Court House or fled 
to police protection. Those unable to flee in time were roughed 
up, with reports of one man having his clothes ripped off and 
another having his head put in a noose.63 
 To stem the growing violence, Mayor Henry put his 
political fortunes on the line again with his use of his powers 
over the city police. On April 15th, a pro-Union mob “swelled 
to many hundreds” outside the office of a notoriously pro-
Southern newspaper, the Palmetto Flag, seeking more violence 
against Southern sympathizers. Henry arrived with the chief 
of police and the Reserve Corps to restore order. As the crowd 
clamored for a speech, Henry deftly calmed the crowd with the 
following:
Your devotion to the flag of your country satisfies me 
that you are equally devoted to the maintenance of the 
laws, and to the preservation of order. I see that there 
are no traitors among you, and I rejoice to know that 
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 When the crowds dispersed but regathered the next day 
at the home of the infamous William Reed, Henry went one 
step farther to protect Southern allies. Reed of course was no 
friend of Henry and those who supported the Peoples Party, 
and afterwards Reed refused to thank the Mayor for his help.65 
Yet in his remarks outside Reed’s home, Henry threatened the 
crowd, ordering the police to shoot to kill to maintain order if 
the crowd did not disperse. The next day, he issued an executive 
proclamation asking residents to identify any persons suspected 
of aiding the enemy. This order required “that all persons shall 
refrain from assembly…unlawfully, riotously, or tumultuously, 
warning them that the same will be at their peril.”66 For Henry, 
order and loyalty were one and the same. Active secessionists 
in his city and rioting anti-secessionists were both disloyal to 
him, their city, and the new war effort. Rather than alienate 
Unionists with his executive crackdown, Henry’s popularity 
skyrocketed, and the city calmed. By April 18th, the streets 
were clear and Union flags adorned the homes of those of all 
political persuasions. While some Southerners left town, most 
retreated into silence, knowing that they were outnumbered, 
but protected if they kept quiet. 67
 Philadelphia also decided to invest in its own military 
protection, creating a Philadelphia Home Guard. Philadelphia’s 
social elite worked with Mayor Henry to create a civil defense 
force under his control that would be independent of the 
city’s forces under the federal government which Lincoln 
was beginning to deploy against the Confederacy. As the 
founders of the Philadelphia Home Guard explained in a 
public proclamation from April 19th, just one week after Fort 
treason cannot rear its head in this city. The flag is 
an emblem of the Government, and I hope that all 
citizens who feel loyal to it will show their respect for 
it and the laws and retire to their respective homes.
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Sumter, “those of our citizens whose ties prevent them from 
undertaking active service, should lose no time in organizing 
a ‘Home Guard’ to be in readiness to repel external aggression 
and to maintain internal order.” They would go on to say 
that the Home Guard would be created by the people: only 
city residents, not the state or the federal government, would 
be responsible for volunteering, training, finances, etc.68 The 
founders included prominent members of the city’s social 
and economic elite. For them, publicly, the Home Guard was 
simply a way for those too old for active service or unable to 
leave their businesses behind to help the war effort.
 However, the Home Guard would also have two ulterior 
purposes that would serve the city and the Union war effort 
more than the older gentlemen ever would have militarily in 
case of an invasion. First and foremost, the Home Guard could 
be an extension of the Mayor’s police forces. Henry Charles 
A depiction of the Volunteer Refreshment Saloon 
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania during the American 
Civil War.
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Lea intimated as much in a later private letter to Mayor Henry, 
saying that with his support the Home Guard will “hold 
themselves…to obey any orders you may give for service” 
within the city.69 Henry had already demonstrated that he was 
willing to use his police powers to maintain order in the city, 
and that police presence was effective. Now, he would have 
some of the city’s most recognizable and powerful leaders aiding 
in that effort. Second, the Home Guard would be a tangible 
mechanism for the city’s leaders, supportive of the Union 
but skeptical about the war effort, to have their voices heard 
and their impact felt. Many members of the Home Guard, 
including Lea, were initially skeptical of Henry and his policies, 
even publicly questioning his spending and infrastructure 
priorities in 1860.70 As powerful businessmen, most had close 
economic and social connections to the South, like their 
aforementioned New York City counterparts, and would 
therefore have some justification for neutrality towards the 
war effort. Instead, the Home Guard prevented neutrality, and 
would, until the creation of the Union League in the next year 
, be the primary mechanism for helping them stay supportive 
and loyal. 
 It is unmistakable that the coming of the Civil War 
was a blessing for Mayor Henry’s political prospects. Though 
Henry had originally hoped his term could avoid national 
debates, the war undeniably strengthened his control over 
Philadelphia and its politics. Before the war, he was severely 
weakened, arguably only winning re-election because of voter 
fraud. He had also proven unable to convince Philadelphia 
voters that his political vision, a party between that of the 
Democrats and Republicans, was a worthwhile course for the 
city. Yet thanks to the war, Henry had a new political mandate. 
His use of the police to foster order, reviled before the war, was 
appreciated by both sides for preventing violence and mayhem. 
Additionally, he worked diligently to foster political alliances 
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with war supporters who may have disagreed with him on other 
political issues. By inviting them into his coalition, perhaps best 
embodied by the forming of the Home Guard, his new allies 
had a vested interest in supporting his administration and his 
policies. This support even extended once Henry started voicing 
some more controversial opinions, granting Henry a veneer of 
bipartisanship and moderation that would severely hamper his 
opponents’ political efforts. 
 Residents and attitudes in New York City also saw a 
sea change in sentiment after Fort Sumter. At a massive rally 
on April 20th, an estimated 50,000 packed Union Square 
for a public pro-war meeting carried out by a wide and 
bipartisan group of the city’s political and economic leaders. 
Organizers included all three mayoral candidates in 1859, 
Havemeyer, Opdyke, and Wood, and the dueling Republican 
newspapermen, Henry Raymond and Horace Greeley. 
Tammany Hall would soon take their own actions, formally 
adopting resolutions declaring they were “heartily united to 
uphold the constitution, enforce the laws, maintain the Union, 
defend the flag…the Union must and shall be preserved.”71 For 
the most part, Tammany Hall would publicly remain strong 
Unionists throughout the war, highlighting their views on the 
war to deflect later charges of disloyalty from both parties. 
In the battle of the presses, Horace Greeley gained an edge, 
according to noted diarist George Templeton Strong, since “the 
Greeley wing of Republicanism” was the chief driver of war in 
the first place, leaving Raymond’s “conservative” wing looking 
like a follower. Greeley’s harsh rhetoric towards the South 
long before Fort Sumter was vindicated by the attack, while 
Raymond’s moderation, plus his ally Seward’s desire for political 
compromise, were now obsolete as the nation sought revenge 
against the “‘chivalric’ bullies and braggarts” of the South.72
 Even Fernando Wood was swept up in the patriotic 
fervor. On April 15th, he issued a proclamation summoning 
citizens “irrespective of all other considerations and prejudices” 
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to obey the law, preserve order, and protect property. Attending 
the city’s first “Union Rally” the next day, he literally draped 
himself with the American flag while exhorting “every man, 
whatever had been his sympathies, to make one great phalanx 
in this controversy, to proceed to conquer a peace. I am with 
you in this contest. We have no party now.” He made similar 
remarks at the rally on the 20th and proposed a special million-
dollar tax to support the war effort and create a “Mozart 
Regiment” under his command.73 To some, this sudden 
transformation was clearly a sham and a political ploy, with one 
unnamed critic growling “The cunning scoundrel sees which 
way the cat is jumping, and put himself right on the record in 
a vague, general way, giving the least offense to his allies of the 
Southern Democracy.” Wood, perhaps indicating this hedging, 
argued in that same flag-draped speech that whether the Union 
would be reunited “by fratricidal warfare or by concession, 
conciliation, and sacrifice” was still unanswered.74 
 Regardless, Wood clearly hoped that his party and his 
base, like he was publicly trying to do, could support the war 
without having to support all of Lincoln’s policies. He also 
hoped they could do so within the new demands of loyalty 
to the Union. Yet, voices remained within the Democratic 
Party that rejected the entire legitimacy of the war and any 
bipartisan accommodations with it or Lincoln. Wood’s brother, 
Benjamin, was perhaps the loudest of these voices. Benjamin 
Wood directly opposed his brother’s transformation, using the 
Daily News, of which he was now the sole editor due to his 
brother’s re-election, to scold Mozart Hall’s war platform, and 
maintaining that only “friends of Peace’’ were true Democrats.75 
In this battle between the Woods, the publisher would beat the 
politician. Mozart Hall formally endorsed Benjamin Wood’s 
sentiments, though they would agree to work with Tammany 
Hall on nominating a united slate in the fall elections if 
possible. This defeat by his own organization would send a 
chilling message for Fernando Wood about straying from his 
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new political base, a message he would long remember going 
forward. 
 The fact that such a vocal minority of Southern 
sympathizers persisted surely damaged New York City’s overall 
loyalty to the war effort. Yet perhaps most significantly, New 
York City would not have a similar institution or organization 
as effective as Philadelphia’s Home Guard. A bipartisan Union 
Defense Committee, of which Fernando Wood was initially 
an ex-officio member and active participant, was formed 
shortly after Fort Sumter by the city Chamber of Commerce. 
Their stated goal was to serve “in aid of the Government in 
the present crisis, to accelerate and facilitate the organization 
of forces, the transportation of troops and provisions, and the 
cooperation of popular action in all loyal parts of the country.”76 
But, its impact and the creation of a Union Party in September 
1861 were only successful primarily upstate.77 Tammany Hall, 
despite agreeing with most of Lincoln’s war policies before 
emancipation, also never publicly considered allying with the 
city’s Republican Party. 
 Therefore, there was no formal infrastructure or alliance 
in place for much of the war to ensure that the city’s elite 
who were generally supportive of the war, but not of Lincoln 
and some of his policies, had buy-in to the war effort. There 
was nothing to ensure their loyalty and continued support. 
In those crucial early days, a bipartisan consensus like that of 
Philadelphia could have been achieved, but it was not. Wood 
also refused to use his executive authority in the same way as 
Henry did to silence dissent and maintain order. For instance, a 
June editorial by his brother claimed that Northerners had been 
tricked into supporting the war effort, and now they had to 
turn against the war and ensure conciliation.78
 Under Wood’s leadership in 1861, not only would the 
Democratic Party not unite in its role as “the loyal opposition,” 
but its anti-war voices were as loud, powerful, and effective at 
rallying their base as ever. It was at this point that New York 
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City and Philadelphia both began to irrevocably diverge on 
their journey through the war. Philadelphia came out of the 
first few months more united and peaceful than before, while 
New York City remained as divided as ever, if not more than 
before. The blame for the continued divisiveness of New York 
City politics is not solely Wood’s, but he played a crucial role. 
Though he had publicly backed much of the pro-war zeal that 
engulfed the city after the attack on Fort Sumter, he privately 
capitulated to his anti-war backers, especially his own brother. 
Furthermore, unlike his counterpart in Philadelphia, he did 
not seek to foster bipartisan loyalty to the war effort or allow 
his political coalition to grow with pro-war voices. By and large 
and in part thanks to Wood, New York City’s political situation 
looked little different in the fall of 1861 than it did in the 
winter of 1861. 
 New York City, additionally, had a crucial and divisive 
mayoral election to endure that year, another reason for its 
continued political divisions. The fact that Philadelphia had no 
major elections in the fall of 1861 is another major reason why 
it remained peaceful and united. Other than a congressional 
special election won by a Democrat, Charles Biddle, there 
were few opportunities for partisan electoral conflict that 
could break the bipartisanship. This gave Henry time and 
resources to realize his mayoral vision and find common 
ground with allies and enemies. He could show the people of 
Philadelphia why they wanted his moderate Unionism and 
strong police power. Additionally, without major elections, 
the city’s Democrats had few opportunities to advance its 
bench of potential elected officials. Thus, the Democratic Party 
continued to highlight politicians of yesteryear, like William 
Reed. Without constituents to serve, and thus their sentiments 
to consider, these party elders even championed recognition of 
the Confederacy as an independent nation.79 As Philadelphians 
were beginning to send their sons and fathers off the war, 
these aging politicians seemed out-of-touch and elitist at best, 
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treasonous at worst. In response, city residents painted the 
entire city’s Democrats with a broad disloyal stroke that many 
Democrats sought to soften by allying with Henry. It would 
take another year for Philadelphia Democrats to elect new 
leaders, but by then they were more focused on national issues 
like emancipation and national forums like Congress, leaving 
the bipartisan leadership of the city and alliances with Henry 
intact.
 As for New York City, Fernando Wood entered his re-
election campaign in a precarious position. His “conversion” 
to Unionism caused distrust and defections from Mozart 
Hall without gaining him new allies. While his opponents 
once again refused a coalition, both Tammany Hall and the 
Republican Party were emboldened by the popularity of the 
war, and both called for its vigorous execution. Tammany Hall 
even declared at their state convention “the first and most 
sacred duty of every man” is to “devote his energies and his 
means, with all his heart and soul, to the earnest and resistless 
prosecution of the war, until the rebellion is utterly suppressed.” 
Furthermore, President Lincoln “is imperatively required...to 
take every step...which may be necessary to secure the triumph 
of our arms...and that his measures will be passed upon by a 
generous and patriotic people...without party spirit.”80 Boldly, 
every Tammany candidate statewide publicly endorsed these 
sentiments.81 Tammany Hall was also emboldened by a new 
interparty consensus. Unlike in 1859 when campaign attacks 
were primarily directed at Havemeyer and Opdyke, Tammany 
Hall and the GOP reached an unofficial détente, training their 
fire solely on Wood, his views on the war, and his policies.82 
 Wood’s chances were further diminished when he was 
credibly accused of corruptly doling out city contracts to close 
allies, while also using city finances for electioneering and 
public election funds for personal gain.83 Severely weakened, 
Wood went to two tried and true methods when a political 
position may be popular, but the candidate is not. First, and 
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more successfully, he publicly decried his investigations as 
politically motivated. He zeroed in on accusations that the 
city’s Corporation Attorney investigated him to advance 
his candidacy for District Attorney, forcing him to publicly 
renounce his candidacy.84 Second, he nationalized his race. On 
November 29th, a week before Election Day, Wood changed 
the tenor of his campaign and his ultimate political destiny 
with a speech at Volks Garten. Casting off any prior support 
for the war effort, Wood charged the Lincoln administration 
with the intention of prolonging the war “as long as there is 
a dollar to be stolen from the National Treasury or a drop of 
Southern blood to be shed.” He also charged Lincoln and the 
Republican Party with being in favor of abolition so free black 
workers could compete with poor white laborers. To Wood, 
the Republican Party hoped for the destruction of immigrants, 
especially his base, since “They will get the Irishmen and 
Germans to fill up the regiments and go forth to defend the 
country…they will themselves remain at home to divide the 
plunder.”85 
 In this speech, Wood publicly relitigated his favorite 
political talking points, especially support for the South and for 
immigrants, specifically Irish and German. Yet privately, Wood 
refused to wholly denounce his prior Unionism. In a curious 
development, the same day that he gave his Volks Garten 
speech he also fired off a defensive letter to Secretary of State 
and fellow New Yorker William Seward. Despite what others 
were saying about him, he was “for a vigorous prosecution of 
the war, for sustaining the administration by every power at 
our command and for the restoration of peace only if it can be 
done consistently with the safety, honor, and unity of the entire 
government.”86 Even with a Republican in the race, Wood 
claimed that he deserved their support for his campaign since 
he best articulated Unionist ideals.
 There are two possible reasons for this letter. One 
is that Wood sincerely believed that, despite his history of 
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controversial comments, including his speech that very day, he 
was loyal to the Union and deserving of Lincoln’s support. That 
idea prompts another question, why this or the fairly pleasant 
reply from Seward’s son thanking Wood for his support for 
the Union, were not released to the public, which could have 
swayed enough skeptics to re-embrace him? Thus, the second 
reason is most likely: Wood was simply a shrewd politician, 
cynically hoping to utilize the Lincoln administration and 
its vast political resources, or at least keep them from being 
used against him. The fact that no evidence exists of Lincoln 
or Seward publicly bashing Wood during the campaign or 
diverting energy to helping elect the Republican indicates that 
Wood’s letter may have been effective. For example, Seward 
did not respond to entreaties from the New York Metropolitan 
Police, a force under state Republican control, to arrest Wood 
for the content of his speech.87 Furthermore, Thurlow Weed 
had privately requested a meeting with Wood the month before 
“if it would not make too much talk,” perhaps to discuss the 
race, though no record exists of if the meeting occurred.88 
 However, the lack of effort may also indicate that the 
Lincoln administration had little confidence a Republican 
could be elected as Mayor of New York City; and, there was 
good reason to assume this. The Republicans had once again 
nominated George Opdyke. A wealthy clothing manufacturer, 
his primary pre-war income came from selling clothes to 
slaves down South, and his Whiggish politics inspired few 
allies. He did gain some Republican approval after his 1859 
loss for working with loyal businessmen during the secession 
crisis to prevent the city’s businessmen from committing “a 
compromise of principle” to assuage the South.89 But, as a 
vocal Republican, he faced constant labeling by Democrats as a 
“black Republican” hoping to emancipate blacks and subjugate 
whites.90 Like Wood, he was also perceived as a politician 
first, civic leader second. George Templeton Strong, though a 
Republican, nonetheless described him as a “pushing, intriguing 
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man, fond of power and position.”91 
 The enigma in the race was the Tammany Hall 
candidate, Charles Godfrey Gunther. Like Opdyke, he was 
a rich merchant. Thus, many assumed he would be closer in 
policy outlook and personality to the Fifth Avenue Democrats. 
However, Gunther was a prominent German activist and 
organizer. Though Wood was primarily concerned with the 
Irish, German immigrants made up a prominent part of his 
anti-war coalition, so it was assumed that Gunther could bring 
parts of Mozart Hall’s base back into Tammany Hall. As for 
Gunther’s appeal to pro-war Democrats, that was less clear. 
Civil War historian Ernest McKay claims that despite being a 
member of Tammany Hall, the “War Democrats,” on specific 
war policies Gunther differed little from the Woods.92 Thus, 
he too inspired little confidence amongst New Yorkers. In the 
end, many New Yorkers cared little about which anti-Wood 
faction won, so long as Wood was gone. As New York political 
historian Sidney Brummer put it, in the minds of many critics 
of Wood and his policies, “Whether to vote for Opdyke or 
for Gunther, was with many simply a question of which had a 
better chance of defeating Wood.”93
 Election Day finally came on December 3rd, 1861, 
and few intimated to guess who would win. Each candidates’ 
headquarters were packed well into the morning. Through the 
night, each group alternated between pessimism and optimism. 
As a potentially foreboding sign, when Opdyke arrived at his 
headquarters early the next morning, someone gave off an alarm 
that the floor was collapsing. Panic ensued, with some suffering 
bruises and torn clothes.94 Early returns indicated a Gunther 
victory, but by ten a.m. Opdyke was declared the winner with 
little more than six hundred votes over Gunther and 1200 over 
Wood. Opdyke won nine of the city’s wards, mostly dominated 
by Republicans, but he also embarrassingly won Wood’s home 
ward by one percent and did especially well in wards populated 
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by former Know Nothings. Gunther, as expected, won the four 
German wards from Wood, but did not win all of the Irish 
wards, splitting them with Wood costing Tammany Hall the 
race.95 Without the Democratic split, especially over immigrant 
votes, it is safe to assume either Wood or Gunther would have 
easily won, but with the split New York City had just had 
its closest three-way race ever and elected its first Republican 
mayor. In what must have been an awkward transition, Wood 
and Opdyke civilly exchanged letters and agreed to meet at 
some point in December.96 
 Perhaps real change could be imparted on the city’s 
policies and its relationships with the war effort and Albany. 
Some Republicans were optimistic, with Henry Bellows 
regarding Opdyke’s election as “an augury of national 
strength.”97 Some, like Strong, while happy that Wood lost, saw 
Opdyke as little more than the lesser of evils.98 But most were 
worried. Even with a Republican mayor, the Republicans who 
controlled Albany were unlikely to grant more power to the 
city, most remaining appointed and elected municipal officials 
were Tammany or Mozart allies, and there was still a hotbed 
of anti-war, anti-black, anti-Lincoln newspapers and activism 
throughout the city. To say that Opdyke’s tenure would be 
divisive and contested would be an understatement, though 
what happened would likely have been more tumultuous 
than most would have anticipated.99 If 1861 was a year for 
Republican gains and Democratic divisions, in both cities, then 
1862 and 1863 would show the power Democrats could yield 
if they united, but also the dangers that unity posed and how 
fragile it would be. 
 This work has sought to compare and contrast New 
York City and Philadelphia politics by looking at how the 
cities, in similar positions demographically, politically, and 
socially before the war, reacted to the conflict. The primary 
framework for doing so has been examining how political 
actors in both cities, from elected officials and party leaders to 
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everyday voters, defined loyalty and disloyalty during an event 
so all-encompassing and divisive. It is without a doubt that 
in both cities, despite their differences by the end of the war, 
some of the same definitions were utilized. Additionally, some 
of the same ideological arguments were made in both cities, 
often by members of the same political party. Both cities also 
endured intraparty feuds that ensured that claims of loyalty 
and disloyalty were not just lobbed at partisan opponents, but 
intraparty ones as well. In writing on Philadelphia during the 
American Civil War period, one hundred years later, historian 
William Dusinberre framed Philadelphia as a city that entered 
the conflict weak and bitter. The city was “fiercely jealous 
of New York,” but also of other cities like Boston and New 
Orleans that had usurped its national and global economic 
output. Its only reliable trading partner was the South, and they 
were now leaving the Union. For decades, it had struggled to 
integrate its ethnically and racially diverse inhabitants into the 
city. These internal tensions led to nativist riots in the 1840s 
and a black population, the largest in the North, with few 
economic or social opportunities. It also had a fragile municipal 
government led by a weak mayor, even after it consolidated 
with its outlying counties in 1854. All in all, there were many 
reasons why many Philadelphia residents had an inferiority 
complex towards their Northern neighbors.100
 The central question of this paper, therefore, has been 
why did Philadelphia and New York City diverge so sharply 
and if and how did conceptions of loyalty and disloyalty play 
a role? Philadelphia’s success at avoiding much of the turmoil 
that befell New York City was due to the leadership of its 
wartime mayor, Alexander Henry. First and foremost, Henry 
took what was once considered a weakness of the municipal 
government of Philadelphia, that as mayor his primary means 
of influence was control over the police, and turned it into 
a positive. Philadelphia easily could have descended into the 
divisiveness and bloodshed of its northern neighbor, and nearly 
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did because it too possessed a loud and somewhat popular anti-
war faction. But it did not, largely because Henry repeatedly, 
fairly, and unequivocally utilized his police powers to maintain 
order.101 He also ruled in a bipartisan manner, avoiding many 
of the contentious and divisive issues of the day. His party, 
first known as the People’s Party and then the Union Party, 
allowed members of different political persuasions to feel 
included and heard in city governance as elected officials, 
members of the Home Guard, and in unofficial capacities. At 
times, especially immediately before Fort Sumter, both of these 
political values made Henry unpopular with both sides, but as 
the war progressed his deft handling of the city granted him 
easy electoral success because more Philadelphians than not 
were invested in the well-being of their city. It is no wonder 
then that Dusinberre, writing a century after Henry retired in 
January of 1866 (mayoral terms had been extended to three 
years during his reign and elections moved to the fall), declared 
that “Alexander Henry’s conduct of the police force from 
1858 to 1865 in itself shows him to have been the best mayor 
Philadelphia ever had.”102
 To conclude, this examination of the years 1859-1861 
promised no easy answers about the types of definitions of 
loyalty and disloyalty employed during the Civil War, nor about 
the reasons why each city ended up on the trajectory it did. As 
I stated earlier, throughout the war there was no simple answer 
about what loyalty and disloyalty meant, and therefore there 
is no simple reason for the fates of the actors and groups from 
Philadelphia and New York City that have been discussed. 
In the end, we must recognize that even if we treat the years 
around the Civil War as being on some clear arc destined to 
bend in a certain direction, there will always be bumps and 
always be outliers. All historians and readers of the era can do 
is try to pull back the curtain of time, reevaluate long standing 
historical assumptions, increase the prominence of forgotten 
leaders and groups of people, and try to understand it all to the 
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best we can, as I have sought to do in this thesis. 
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es in the mid-nineteenth century
William Zimmermann
Introduction
 The nineteenth century was a significant time for the 
United States and for American business. The United States 
emerged as a world power in this century, evolving from a fledg-
ling coastal state into a continental giant. Much of this geopo-
litical expansion was fueled through the rapid growth of the 
American economy. In order to understand how the American 
economy was transformed, it is first helpful to understand how 
American business was transformed. This research paper seeks 
to answer this question by analyzing the accounting practices 
of railroads in the mid-nineteenth century. Accounting is the 
language of business and can be used to analyze the dynamics 
of mid-nineteenth century business. Contemporarily, managers, 
investors, and regulators use accounting-based financial reports 
to try to better understand a firm’s operations and economic 
situation. Therefore, financial reports and commentary on them 
from the period will yield critical knowledge on how different 
economic agents (managers, investors, creditors, regulators, and 
others) interacted and communicated with each other in the 
adolescent phase of both American capitalism and corporate 
culture.
 The railroad industry was chosen because it was the 
most significant industry of the mid-nineteenth century and 
perhaps the most significant industry of the whole period. 
Railroads were the first to adopt a corporate business organi-
zation that would later mature to the corporate organization 
recognizable today. The reason the railroad industry adopted 
large corporate structures was its need to raise large amounts of 
capital. Railroads needed to construct and maintain hundreds 
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of miles of track, purchase expensive engines, and build stations 
to operate the tracks. Railroad managers turned to the public to 
find both investors and creditors in order to afford the massive 
initial costs required to start railroad. Since the investors were 
the actual owners of the railroad, managers needed to integrate 
investors into the administration of the firm. This was done al-
most exclusively through forming a corporation, with investors 
electing a board of directors to appoint managers. The number 
of investors and size of railroads made them massive organiza-
tions, and the capital needs and scope of railroads led to further 
development of the corporate form of business organization. A 
critically important feature of the American economy’s growth 
in the nineteenth century was the maturation and widespread 
adoption of corporations in the United States. Since railroads 
were the most influential corporations of the mid-nineteenth 
century, it is logical to focus on them to understand the wider 
economy. Finally, focusing on the mid-nineteenth century will 
be insightful because it was the period where annual reports 
became truly sophisticated while also remaining unstandardized 
by national legislation. Railroads weren’t universally regulated 
by the federal government until the passage of the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 1887 and annual reports weren’t standardized 
until 1906 with the passage of the Hepburn Act, although the 
federal government did have some reporting requirements for 
railroads that received federal money. Instead, individual states 
had a wide variety of regulations and requirements for financial 
reporting. Since an important theme of the nineteenth-century 
American economy was the early development of modern busi-
ness, understanding how firms acted without strict guidelines or 
standards will be especially valuable.
 Financial reporting developed significantly in this peri-
od, prompted by the demands of corporations such as railroads. 
While financial information had been considered proprietary 
during most of the First Industrial Revolution, it was necessary 
for railroads to report this information publicly to their owners 
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– the shareholders. This rapid development in the sophistication 
of financial reporting was driven both by the legal requirements 
of the federal and state governments and by the demands of 
investors. During this period, the novelty of financial reporting 
and the lack of standardization meant that managers were able 
to experiment greatly with how reports were made. Occasion-
ally, this allowed unscrupulous managers to create misleading or 
fraudulent reports. For the most part, however, financial reports 
of this period were impressively informative and enlightening. 
Accounting theory also reached high levels of sophistication, 
although it was inhibited by a lack of standardization. This 
lack of standardization incentivized managers to choose the ac-
counting methods that reflected well on the firm over methods 
that reflected the real economic situation. Much like today, 
financial reports were primarily focused on the status of the 
company and its profitability. Annual reports usually contained 
only information on the balance sheet and income statement. 
Since railroads usually used a cash basis, the income statement 
somewhat mirrored the cash flows from operating activities, 
which could be used to evaluate the firm’s ability to pay debt 
and distribute dividends. Managers also used accounting to bet-
ter understand their operations and gather detailed statistical 
summaries. Similar to how investors used accounting to evalu-
ate a firm, managers often used these figures to aid in strategic 
decision making. Overall, railroad accounting in this period was 
impressively sophisticated.
Federal and State Requirements for Financial Reports
 In contemporary America, anyone familiar with busi-
ness has some familiarity with a Form 10-K. In the United 
States and most modern economies, financial reporting for 
public companies is a strictly regulated and standardized prac-
tice. Governments and standard setting authorities have created 
detailed methods on how a firm should assemble and present 
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its books to regulators and investors. Beyond government au-
thorities, groups like the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) have created detailed rules on how to prepare financial 
statements. These rules, US GAAP from FASB and IFRS from 
IASB, have been made by regulators to be the standard method 
for accounting in public companies. However ubiquitous now, 
this state of affairs should not be taken for granted. Rigorous 
and detailed accounting standards did not exist in the mid-
nineteenth century. 
 Since their inception, railroads have been closely con-
nected to the federal and state governments. The federal and 
state governments were very interested in the development and 
success of railroad companies, because populating and connect-
ing America’s quickly expanding territory required an extensive 
infrastructural network. Furthermore, at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, a state charter was usually required or de-
sired for incorporation, so most railroads wanted some level of 
state recognition. Therefore, both the federal and state govern-
ments were very involved in the establishment and funding of 
railroads; meanwhile, other investors welcomed government 
participation as a means to receive a favorable charter and con-
tinued state support. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or ‘the 
B&O,’ provides an excellent example of how this close relation-
ship between state governments and railroads was reflected in 
railroad accounting. When the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or 
the B&O, was created, “civic pride rather than profits made the 
B&O from its origin a ‘community enterprise’.”1 Beyond civic 
pride, the B&O almost functioned as a state company and “in 
granting the charter for incorporating the B&O, the Maryland 
legislature retained the authority to set rates… [and] exempted 
the railroad from tax.”2 The railroad’s charter played a very sig-
nificant role in developing financial reporting in railroads and 
beyond. When B&O was incorporated, “the B&O Charter… 
required that stockholders be issued an annual ‘Statement 
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of Affairs.’”3 However, that was the limit of the detail in the 
statutory requirement. Impressively, this ‘Statement of Affairs’ 
evolved from “a five-page letter from the president to the inves-
tors” in 1827 into an impressively sophisticated annual report 
that included “the first modern example of a private corpora-
tion reporting revenues and expenses to stockholders” in 1832.4 
Therefore, the business environment in which railroads devel-
oped not only legally required some form of financial reporting, 
but also encouraged the development of sophisticated account-
ing and reports.
 The federal government also fostered the development 
of financial reporting through statutes and requirements. Simi-
lar to the states, the widespread and generous use of federal 
funds in supplying capital to railroads prompted the federal 
government to legally require railroads to provide vital informa-
tion regarding their operations and status. In 1862, Congress 
passed the renowned Pacific Railroad Act, which enabled the 
Treasury to issue bonds to railroads for the construction of a 
transcontinental railroad. In Section 20 of the legislation, the 
government required railroads to
            5
 The complex and detailed requirements of this legisla-
tion demonstrates that the annual reports were, indeed, becom-
ing more and more sophisticated. Further, the evolution of 
[submit to] the Secretary of the Treasury an annual report 
wherein shall be … First. The names of the stockhold-
ers… Second. The names and residences of the direc-
tors… Third. The amount of stock subscribed, and the 
amount thereof actually paid in… Fourth. A description 
of the lines of road surveyed, of the lines thereof fixed 
upon for the construction of the road, and the cost of 
such surveys ; Fifth. The amount received from passen-
gers on the road ; Sixth. The amount received for freight 
thereon ; Seventh. A statement of the expense of said road 
and its fixtures ; Eighth. A statement of the indebtedness 
of said company, setting forth the various kinds thereof.
Penn History Review     64 
American Railroad Accounting Practices
the required information from the annual reports of the B&O 
charter to the requirements here reveals that governments were 
becoming more exacting in the reports they received, acting 
as both investors and regulators. Outlined in the legislation, 
regulators were requiring the railroads to report on their capital 
structure, their revenue and expenses, and the current lines they 
were developing or operating.
 By 20 years later, railroads had already become the 
largest business in the world. Pursuant to statutory reporting 
requirements, the Auditor of Railroad Accounts sent the Sec-
retary of the Interior an annual report containing information 
on all railroads that had received some form of federal aid. This 
report contained vital information on what financial reports re-
ally consisted of in the mid-nineteenth century. In Appendix E 
of the report, there were three forms the railroads were required 
to submit. These were Form No. 8-001, essentially the balance 
sheet, Form No. 8-002, a report on the financial and statisti-
cal status of the railroad, and Form No. 8-003, essentially the 
income statement.6 Remarkably, annual reports had evolved in 
the span of just a few decades from brief letters to complex logs 
analogous with modern reports. Contained in the 1880 Annual 
Report of the Auditor of Railroad Accounts, many railroads’ 
financials were displayed in such a way that even modern read-
ers can have some grasp of their business’ operations and status. 
That ability is the power of financial reports.
 Both the federal and state governments mandated the 
creation of financial reports for several reasons. Governments’ 
financial stakes in many railroads is an obvious reason. Much 
like other shareholders, governments hoped to ensure that 
their investments, grants, or other forms of aid were being used 
wisely by management to promote the development and success 
of the firm. Another reason for governments to observe rail-
roads’ businesses through financial reporting was due to the use 
of railroads as a quasi-state agency. As previously discussed, the 
government often had the authority to decide the rates railroads 
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could charge or limit the profit margins of a firm. This was 
done purposefully because governments saw the railroad as a 
means of promoting commerce and economic activity in the re-
gion. This was the tradeoff that firms faced when they accepted 
governmental investments. The state vigorously promoted the 
expansion of railroads but did this in order to pursue additional 
economic and political objectives. Managers, who were content 
with receiving government aid, also had to accept this level of 
oversight. 
 The development of financial reports is an important 
piece of evidence in revealing this relationship. This is a very 
significant observation about the origins of American corpora-
tions. The government participated in an intimate way with 
the creation and funding of the first American corporations. 
This differs greatly from the free-market ideology or politics as-
sociated with American corporate culture today. Early railroads 
were often created and incorporated by legislatures and later 
railroads received significant funding from the federal and state 
governments in order to achieve government goals, which were 
partially aligned with private investors. Therefore, from its be-
ginning financial reporting was not only just a method to rem-
edy information asymmetries between managers and investors 
but was also a mechanism allowing the government to watch 
over and control industries it identified as nationally significant.
Management – Goals and Uses for Financial Reports
 Although the practice of reporting was required under 
legal statutes, managers had a great deal of flexibility in how 
they created their annual reports, as comprehensive industry 
standards like US GAAP or IFRS had yet to be introduced. 
Since managers had such a high degree of agency over their 
reports, studying the various reporting methods used by man-
agers can reveal their differentiated prerogatives with financial 
reporting. Managers had to report the status of the business to 
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regulators and investors, but they were often at the liberty of ad-
justing their accounting methods to make their firm look more 
attractive. Perhaps most interestingly, it seems that managers 
also used the creation of annual reports and detailed accounting 
to inform themselves about their firm’s financial situation. In a 
time before the internet and data science, managers could often 
be unaware of many of the details of the railroad’s operations. 
Therefore, managers often created detailed microeconomic 
analyses of their business while making their financials. Much 
like investors, managers were able to use detailed information 
on their earnings and operations for strategic decision making.
 Early railroad managers’ chief difficulty in creating an-
nual reports lies in the lack of precedents in business. Unlike 
contemporary CEO’s and CFO’s, they were never exposed to 
a Form 10-K in a business school class. Instead, many railroad 
executives chose to mimic existing firms’ annual reports. Since 
the B&O was the oldest railroad in the United States, it “was 
known as ‘the B&O University’ and its annual reports were 
viewed as textbooks about railroading, and engineering and 
financial developments disclosed were closely followed by other 
railroads.”7 Again, the influence of regulators can be seen, for 
the Maryland legislature’s reporting requirements impacted the 
practices of railroads far outside of the state. This mimicking 
highlights that while there was great variety in annual reporting, 
managers were not operating in a bubble and industry standards 
did exist within a range of acceptability.
 The formal arrangement of three primary statements 
(the balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash 
flows) did not yet exist but reports generally contained sub-
stantial information for all three categories. Firms seem to have 
almost universally presented a balance sheet (listing assets, li-
abilities, and stockholders’ equity) and an income statement 
with revenues and expenses. The combination of the balance 
sheet and income statement captured some of the information 
typically found in a statement of cash flows since “initially most 
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railroad accounting records were kept on a cash basis.”8 The 
primary focus of managers seems to have been reporting and 
analyzing their revenues and expenses. Similar to contemporary 
managerial focuses on ‘free cash flow’ and EBITDA, railroad 
managers of the mid-nineteenth century were deeply interested 
in their ability to generate cash to fund expansions and pay 
dividends and “as a result their reports primarily dealt with the 
sources and disposition of cash and with statistical measure of 
the flow of traffic.”9 How firms measured their revenues and 
expenses, which was an approximation of cash flow, had sig-
nificant implications for their reported profitability. All of these 
reports together (the balance sheet, income statement, and sta-
tistical analysis) gave both managers and investors an incredible 
view into the operations and health of the railroad.
 The creation of annual reports led to many challenges 
for accountants, because they often had to develop account-
ing theory ad hoc. One of the major challenges of this sort for 
railroads was accounting for long-lived fixed assets. Valuing the 
many miles of railroad tracks was difficult for accountants, but 
critically important for managers, since a huge portion of the 
total assets of a railroad were in fixed assets like tracks. Even 
contemporarily, there are many methods of accounting for 
long-lived assets and reporting methods in the United States 
that don’t match with the methods employed by taxing authori-
ties. US GAAP allows for straight-line depreciation, sum-of-the-
year’s-digits, and several other methods. Meanwhile, the IRS 
uses a system called MACRS. 
 Going back over a century, managers had even less prec-
edent or theory to work with. As explained by James Boock-
hodlt, there were several popular methods, each with their own 
pros and cons. It bears to keep in mind that despite the relative 
youth of annual reporting, some of these methods were surpris-
ingly sophisticated and resemble modern accounting standards. 
Three quasi-popular methods included: “periodic revaluation,” 
which was similar to mark-to-market valuation with pretty 
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frequent upward adjustments; an annuity method, which paid 
the annuity in order to create a future fund to pay for the re-
placement of the assets; finally, there was the ‘renewal method,’ 
which was similar to accumulated depreciation and expensed 
the decline of an assets value over time.10 All of these methods 
had advantages and disadvantages, but they achieved something 
significant: expensing the costs of capitalized assets. Overall, the 
development of these methods was evidence of the impressive 
improvements in accounting theory during this period. Admit-
tedly, mid-nineteenth century managers had a level of discretion 
over the creation of their reports that today would be deeply 
unsettling. Despite that, some managers and railroads did pro-
duce high quality reports that attempted to give investors a 
pretty objective view of their property.
 However, some managers were not as noble because 
these expenses could have such a major impact on the bottom 
line of a railroad. Many wanted to be slyer in their expensing 
of capital assets and, in the absence of strict accounting stan-
dards, they could get away with what is today euphemistically 
called “creative accounting”. While some of the methods tried 
to periodically expense some part of their capital assets, most 
firms used “the retirement method of accounting for fixed as-
sets… under this method, the expense due to the exhaustion of 
property was recognized at the time of the retirement of a unit 
of the property.”11 This method ultimately replaced the other 
three as the most popular among managers. The justification for 
this method was that “as long as the property was maintained 
in good repair then no decrease in the value of the asset had 
occurred.” In contemporary business, this accounting theory 
would not be accepted. Depreciation has man12y definitions, 
but economic depreciation is usually characterized as the de-
cline in the future benefits (or cash flows) from the asset due to 
its use that year. These assets had a limited lifespan and would 
eventually need to be replaced, regardless of what amount of 
repair the railroad companies conducted on tracks, engines, 
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and other capital equipment. Therefore, firms should have ac-
counted for this decline with some sort of record of the implied 
expense. For shareholders, this was really dubious accounting; 
the intrinsic value of their equity was the net of assets and li-
abilities. With the retirement method, a railroad track would be 
worth its capitalized costs until the day it was to be retired and 
replaced with new track. Instead of gradual depreciation, on the 
day of retirement investors would be faced with a massive loss 
in the value of their equity in the firm caused by a sudden drop 
in the net value of assets. So, while the accounting justification 
of the method was not very firm, there was another justifica-
tion for its use: retirement accounting was very beneficial for 
management. Through the use of this method, managers could 
boost their bottom line significantly. Furthermore, many states 
set the rates railroads could charge customers, which was often 
done by placing a cap on the railroad’s profit as a percentage of 
its assets. Therefore, a railroad could set higher rates and earn a 
larger profit with a higher asset valuation. In that situation, the 
interests of managers and investors were closely aligned against 
regulators.
 Management’s uses for accounting didn’t end at the cre-
ation of annual reports for investors and regulators. Accounting 
could also enable management to get an analytical and objective 
look at the numbers of their operations. An 1879 treatise writ-
ten by Marshall Kirkman in The Railroad Gazette captures many 
of the managerial uses for accounting and reports. Kirkman was 
a unique authority on the development and codification of rail-
road accounting. He served as the General Accountant and later 
Vice President of the Chicago and North Western Railway, and 
he was also one of the founders of the Accounting Division of 
the American Association of Railroads. In the treatise, Kirkman 
lays out modern accounting theory and practices for other man-
agers and accountants in the industry. He confirms the prevail-
ing standard of two statement accounting, saying both “a gener-
al balance sheet, then, should embrace a clear, concise summary 
Penn History Review     70 
American Railroad Accounting Practices
of the liabilities of the company, including its capital stock, also 
the property and assets owned by it” and “the income account” 
which should embrace “the earnings and incidental expense 
accounts of the company” with earnings appearing “upon the 
ledger as a credit balance” and expenses appearing “as debit bal-
ances upon the general ledger” with “the difference or balance 
between the credit and debit” constituting “the Undivided In-
come of the property.”13 More interestingly, he points out that 
accountants and their reports served as vitally important sources 
of information for management in this period, since “to the ig-
norant and unthinking, the various sub-divisions of railway ser-
vice have apparently little or no relation to each other… [but] 
the accountant should possess an intimate knowledge of the mi-
nutiae of the different classes of accounts.”14 His approach is de-
centralized, and he suggests “the returns from agents and others 
are, so far as practicable, allowed to reach the general account-
ing officer through the hands of the department officers and 
division superintendents of the company.”15 He maintained that 
decentralization ensures that middle management becomes far 
more familiar with their operations since “[the] plan enables the 
officers to acquaint themselves generally with the details of their 
several branches of business without requiring special reports.”16 
This use of accounting was significant and valuable to manage-
ment. Managers who were neither able to look into databases 
to see revenue numbers nor access client information were now 
able to view detailed reports of their receipts and operations and 
have an objective view of their true situation.
 Marshall Kirkman was not the only manager who saw 
the potential of detailed annual reports for managerial analysis. 
Albert Fink, the Vice President and General Superintendent of 
the Louisville & Nashville and Great Southern Railroad, also 
wrote a treatise on railroad accounting. In his work, Fink clearly 
lays out the importance of detailed and accurate accounting, 
saying:
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           17
 Here, Fink touches on very deep ideas. Fink is coming 
close to writing microeconomic theory, approaching railroad 
management as an in-depth exercise in cost minimization and 
profit maximization. Accounting is central to this managerial 
approach and therefore becomes a powerful manager tool for 
analysis and informed decision making. One of Fink’s annual 
reports composed between the years 1873 and 1874 was even 
included as one of the course readings, which includes some 
of his statistical measures. Fink and other managers developed 
and produced many tables of data and statistics for use by in-
vestors and managers alike. Similar to the statistics used in the 
nascent art of sabermetrics during this period, managers created 
all sorts of interesting ratios and measures. One such statistic 
was a ‘movement expenses per ton-mile’ which is equal to the 
movement expenses per train mile (sourced from their own data 
table) over the average number of tons of freight in each train. 
Combining this with three other measures (station expenses per 
ton-mile, maintenance of road per ton-mile, and interest per 
ton-mile) added up to find the total cost per ton-mile.18 Like a 
baseball manager analyzing a player’s batting average and field-
If the percentage of operating expenses to net earnings, or the 
cost of one ton of freight or one passenger transported one mile, 
can not be used as an absolute measure of economy, or even as a 
measure of comparison, and we have seen it can not, the ques-
tion arises, what is the proper course to pursue in ascertaining 
whether a railroad is economically operated or not?
To this the answer must be given that the only mode of ascer-
taining this fact thoroughly is to make an examination of each 
item of expenditure incurred in the operation of a railroad, and 
see whether this has been reduced to a minimum and the service 
rendered to a maximum… but even that knowledge would be 
of little avail unless the accounts of the operating expenditures 
of railroads are kept in such a manner as to exhibit in detail not 
only the expenditures, but also the amount of work performed 
for each item of expenditures.
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ing percentage, railroad managers could use these measures 
to closely analyze their cost structure. The work of these two 
writers, each important and influential managers of the time, 
highlight just how sophisticated and powerful accounting had 
become. Quickly rising from short memos to investors, annual 
reports eventually became sophisticated and detailed enough to 
enable managers to use them in order to make strategic deci-
sions.   
Shareholders’ Expectations and Frustrations with Financial Re-
ports
  Just like the federal and state governments, private 
investors were very interested in railroads. Similar to the tech 
stocks of the 1990’s into the present, railroads were the exciting 
and disruptive industry of the future during the mid-nineteenth 
century. However, the motivations of private investors obviously 
differed from those of the government. While the government 
sought to promote railroads in order to develop the economy 
of the country and build infrastructure to connect its distant 
regions together, private investors were interested in making 
money from their investment. With this motivation for invest-
ment, private shareholders were deeply interested in the annual 
financial reports of the railroads. These reports were used by 
shareholders to assess the position of the firm and the value of 
their property; a dependable and trustworthy report was the 
only way a shareholder could measure the value of his owner-
ship objectively. Financial reports existed because of government 
requirements and investor demand for them, however, their lack 
of standardization was a source of aggravation. Many managers 
were incentivized, as they still are, to fudge or outright manipu-
late numbers in their annual report to make their firm look like 
a better investment. The variety in methods of reporting and 
the desire of some managers to make inaccurate or fraudulent 
reports meant that the quality of annual reports differed greatly 
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from one report to the next. This was a major issue for inves-
tors, and one that caused a good deal of frustration and fear.
 In an 1879 edition of the North American Review, an 
article entitled “The Mysteries of American Railway Account-
ing” captured many of the contemporary issues that investors 
had with railroad securities. The article zeros in on the lax and 
perhaps fraudulent accounting standards of the New York Cen-
tral Railroad, one of the premier railroads at this time. Investors 
could have forgiven the industry if the managers of some fringe 
regional railroad were making questionable decisions with their 
accounting. Yet, the New York Central, on the other hand, was 
one of the country’s premier railroads. If there were serious is-
sues with this railroad, that would have represented an indict-
ment of the whole industry. 
 The author alleges many issues with the company, start-
ing with a failure of the New York State regulating authorities. 
As the author makes clear, “the laws of New York, which, as 
they now stand, render possible, either the rendering of no 
account whatever of their financial condition, by companies 
whose stocks may constitute the sole means of subsistence of 
otherwise helpless families, or the publishing of such state-
ments, or reports, as are a mockery of the law, and an insult to 
the common sense of every business man.”19 Without proper 
enforcement of some level of quality in financial reporting, 
the state of business in New York would enter into a bad state. 
Honest and objective reporting was critical since “every well-
regulated State very properly undertakes to control many of 
its public corporation, so that, through a perfect knowledge 
of their financial condition, only to be ascertained through 
complete and enforced reports, the public at large may know 
to what extent it is safe to trust their promises to pay, losses, 
interest, or dividends, as the case may be.”20 Because of their 
business, railroads were dependent on the public as a source of 
capital. 
 The erosion of public trust and faith in the honesty of 
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financial reports could threaten the legitimacy of state authori-
ties and honest businesses in New York. However, at the writ-
ing of the article, the demand for New York Central stock was 
healthy as the railroad was able to consistently pay a dividend 
on the stock. The author makes this clear, saying, “for some ten 
years, no perfect “general balance-sheet” has been published by 
the company… instead of awakening the suspicions of brokers 
and investors, [this] seems to have been entirely ignored. The 
market price of the stock has been governed by the fact that it 
has paid eight per cent dividends, regardless of the absence of 
any proof of its intrinsic value, as indicated by the existence 
of a due proportion of assets to liabilities.”21 Just like contem-
porary bubbles and accounting scandals, investors were either 
uninterested in any problems with annual reports, despite their 
objective importance, or were unaware of these issues with New 
York Central’s accounting. This yields a significant observation: 
regulation was critically important, for the public often did not 
review annual reports closely as long as superficial indicators of 
success like dividends were present.
 Despite some investors’ ignorance about dubious re-
porting, railroads companies were still very sensitive to public 
doubts about their securities. The impact of the New York Re-
view article was damning on the railroad industry as a whole, 
and it certainly was not the only place such opinions could have 
been found. Enough public doubt in the industry could have 
led to a severe drop in the share prices of firms across the na-
tion. Yet beyond the dubious or potentially fraudulent annual 
reports of the New York Central, the accounting methods used 
in formulating such annual reports of many other railroads 
could also easily lead to public distrust. As discussed earlier, 
conventions such as the retirement method for valuing long-
lived fixed assets produced annual reports that kept in mind 
only the interests of the management, rather than those of the 
stockholders. The management of an individual firm was often 
deeply interested in dispelling any doubts about the value of 
the property behind their own firm’s stocks, especially if these 
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doubts were already being vocalized by stockholders.
 In response to the fear of shareholders in their firm, 
the Board of Directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company 
launched a committee, headed by William Stokely, the Mayor 
of Philadelphia, to investigate its accounts and perform a full 
audit of their balance sheet. Made in response to complaints 
from stockholders, its explicit goal was to “meeting to examine 
all the property of the Company… to make an appraisement 
of the value of the roads, shops, machinery, real estate, depots, 
bonds, stocks, and all other assets of the Company; also, to 
examine into the liabilities and obligations of the Company.”22 
Similar to the use of annual reports to generate insightful sta-
tistics for management, this committee also attempted to in-
vestigate “the wisdom of the past policy of your Company, and 
to make any suggestions that we may deem likely to conduce 
to its greater prosperity in the future.”23 Therefore management 
could use the report along with shareholders in order to better 
understand the realities of their operations. As always, accurate 
reporting could benefit both groups, since objective measure-
ments of the operation allows both investors and managers to 
make strategic decisions regarding the company.
 The committee quickly proved itself to be much more 
than a public relations stunt from the board through the clear 
repudiation of several decisions of the firm. For instance, the 
committee removed a several million-dollar investment in the 
United New Jersey Railroad and Canal Company from their 
balance sheet because it was a “mythical account” which was 
neither “part of the assets or liabilities of the Pennsylvania Rail-
road Company.”24 Apparently, this investment was really the 
property of a New Jersey railroad from which the Pennsylvania 
Railroad Company leased railroad lines. Whether this mistake 
was intentional or unintentional is unclear and the committee 
doesn’t make a great effort to investigate this, preferring correc-
tion over investigation. 
 The committee also specifically mentions several costly 
mistakes made by management over the years. The report zeros 
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in on a group of investments on railroad lines south of Balti-
more. The Pennsylvania Railroad focused its operations mainly 
in the Mid-Atlantic and the Midwest, so expansion southwards 
was a move out of the norm for the firm. This expansion re-
sulted in failure, with the revenues from the lines barely break-
ing past the operating expenses incurred. The committee held 
nothing back in their criticism of the management’s decision to 
expand, stating that “in making investments south of Baltimore 
without your consent, by which nearly $5,000,000 have been 
lost to your Company.”25 However, the committee immediately 
sought to rebuild the confidence of its shareholders, point-
ing out that this loss “illustrates the dangers against which we 
endeavor to guard, as explained in other parts of this report.”26 
Through open admission of the mistakes and an effort in the 
report to explain methods to avoid another mistake like this in 
the future, the committee attempted to win back stockholder 
confidence not just in their reports but also their operations. 
Overall, it is impressive to see the committee attempting to 
win back stockholder confidence by cleaning up past mistakes 
and proposing methods to avoid future mistakes. Many other 
firms would have not had the same integrity to correct for past 
mistakes. The zealous efforts of the committee demonstrates 
the Board of Directors’ devotion to its fiduciary duty. Any past 
mistakes made by management could be corrected by the com-
mittee, with shareholders associating the governance of the firm 
more with the committee than with the management.
 It is apparent that investor confidence in the veracity 
and accuracy of annual reports was shaky at best. Especially for 
more business savvy investors, the methods of assembling an-
nual reports could often be seen as unsatisfactory as it could be 
difficult to divine the true value of an investment in a firm from 
their financial reports. While many firms attempted to remedy 
this through investigation committees like that of the Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Company, these efforts were perhaps unneces-
sary. Overall, it seems that the regular payment of dividends was 
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the most important factor in winning investors over, regardless 
of whether such dividends were sustainable. The author of “The 
Mysteries of American Railway Accounting” was an accountant, 
or at least anonymously claimed to be one, so naturally as a pro-
fessional he was able to zero in on issues in the New York Cen-
tral’s financial reports. Laymen investors who were less able to 
interpret annual reports, let alone tease out discrepancies, would 
have been less sensitive about their quality so long as such is-
sues were not directly brought to their attention. This highlights 
both the importance of honest management and firm regula-
tors, both then and now. Through a combination of the two, 
business would remain in high repute, and people of all stripes 
could participate in corporate ownership.
Conclusion
 The accounting practices of the railroad industry in the 
mid-nineteenth century were truly remarkable in both for their 
sophistication and rapid development. Prior to the railroads, 
businesses were never expected to release any sort of substan-
tial reports. The business of railroads required not only large 
numbers of investors and creditors but also an unprecedented 
amount of equity and debt. The demand of the investors even-
tually led to the demand for annual reports. Furthermore, the 
federal and state governments, heavily invested in the railroad 
business and interested in overseeing their operations, required 
annual reports to be made to supervise over the railroads’ 
status and operations. Thus, both the state and private inves-
tors demanded annual reports as evidence of the value of their 
property. Coincidentally, the development of railroads as large 
and sophisticated corporations was mirrored by the evolution 
of their annual reports from brief letters to comprehensive and 
sophisticated documents. Beyond the demand from govern-
ments and private investors, managers also used accounting and 
annual reports as an opportunity to analyze their operations and 
gain a better strategic understanding of their firm’s positions.
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 Although railroads declined in national importance with 
the rise of cars, trucks, and planes, they had lasting impacts on 
American business. Other corporations adopted and expanded 
on the model of railroads, and their corporate organizations and 
practices were highly influenced by them. With that in mind, 
these annual reports are especially significant. They not only of-
fer critical insights into the relationships of firms, investors, and 
regulators in the 1870’s, but they also have significant implica-
tions on how those relationships are formed even today.
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Introduction  
 The “fundamental design” of the international commu-
nist movement and the goal of Soviet leaders, according to George 
Kennan in NSC-68, was “ to retain and solidify their absolute 
power” through “the dynamic extension of their authority” and 
“the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machin-
ery of government and structure of society in the countries of the 
non-Soviet world.”1 Such strategy threatened the power of the 
United States; consequently, Washington policy makers believed 
they had to exercise whatever extent of economic, political, or 
military influence necessary to counter the communist expansion 
inherently tied to the USSR. This belief lay at the core of the United 
States’ foreign policy for decades - from the execution of the Mar-
shall Plan to involvement in the Vietnam War, Washington bu-
reaucrats willingly intervened in the domestic affairs of other na-
tions in the name of halting the infectious spread of communism. 
 Mexico, notwithstanding the close bond it shared with 
the dominant anticommunist power, endorsed an outlook al-
most antithetical to that of the United States. During the Cold 
War, Mexico maintained its adherence to the Estrada Doctrine. 
First established by Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada in 1930, the 
doctrine advocated for each country’s right to self-determination 
and emphasized the importance of nonintervention. This doc-
trine, alongside a concern for its own independence, informed 
Mexico’s insistence on the inclusion of noninterventionist prin-
ciples in the Charter for the Organization of American States 
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or example of the United states’ ardent 
anti-communism
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(OAS) and its willingness to interact with communist countries.2
 The world views of the United States and Mexico col-
lided when Fidel Castro successfully led the Cuban Revolu-
tion of 1959 and established the first openly socialist state in 
Latin America. The United States, after identifying the com-
munist threat on its doorstep, responded swiftly and sought to 
lead the Western Hemisphere’s response, serving as an example 
for the other Latin American countries to follow. After impos-
ing its own sanctions on Cuba, American delegates to the OAS 
attempted to persuade Latin American member nations to act 
as anticommunist crusaders and chastise Cuba with harsh eco-
nomic and political retaliations. In their view, OAS members had 
to recognize the existing expansionist threat of communists and 
cease relations with Cuba to prevent its efforts to spark revo-
lutions in other countries. While the American delegates could 
not achieve their ultimate goal of having the OAS swiftly as-
sail Cuba, they succeeded in forcing them to impose sanctions 
against the island at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs in 1964. The resolution of this meet-
ing concluded that Cuba had sponsored “terrorism, sabotage, 
assault, and guerilla warfare” in Venezuela.3 More importantly, 
it resolved that in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance “the governments of 
the American states [should] not maintain diplomatic or con-
sular relations with the Government of Cuba” and required that 
they suspend all their trade and sea transportation with Cuba. 4
 Mexico, defying the expectations of the Washington del-
egation, “steadfastly opposed any obligatory sanctions against 
Cuba” on behalf of the OAS even before the conference be-
gan.5 Even after Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Brazil (the last 
OAS members to hold out on severing relations with Cuba) 
adopted the resolution, Mexico still refused to follow suit. In-
stead, it chose to maintain economic and political interaction 
with the island.6 Because of this, Mexico transformed into a 
“window” from the mainland Americas into Cuba and served 
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as the only entry point into the island from the Western Hemi-
sphere.7 Mexico’s decision to retain its relationship with Cuba 
posed a threat to the anticommunist agenda of the United States 
on primarily two fronts: firstly, in Mexico’s domestic arena and 
secondly, in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba, through its consis-
tent contact with Mexico, could catalyze a communist uprising 
in the country, or use it as a base to export Cuban subversives 
to spark insurgencies in neighboring Latin American nations.
Considering the United States’ determination to suppress any 
communist entity, the significance of Cuba as the only social-
ist nation which penetrated the anticommunist sanctuary that 
the U.S. had sought to establish in the Western Hemisphere, 
and the geographical proximity of Mexico, the predictable 
course of action for the United States would have been to ex-
plosively retaliate against its neighbor. Despite all of this, the 
United States government did not punish Mexico in any way. 
The relationship between Mexico and the United States dur-
ing this time suffered no significant harm and continued cor-
dially.8 Why then, did the staunchest advocate of anti-com-
munism not excoriate its neighbor when it continued to 
interact with a communist country on both of their doorsteps?
 
Cold War Historiography: The United    
States, Mexico, and Holes in the Literature  
 For decades American scholars have studied the Cold 
War, and the already expansive literature continues to evolve. 
Historians have debated for decades on the origins of the Cold 
War, offering political, economic, and ideological reasonings for 
its inevitability. They have increasingly focused on the insepa-
rable nature of foreign and domestic policy, leading to the up-
surge in social history analyses that take the international context 
of the Cold War into account. This has produced studies that 
examine the effect that the war’s rhetoric had on the Civil Rights 
Movement, blue collar workers, women, and other societal 
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groups. As scholars explore the dynamics of social history and its 
international context in more depth, political history has largely 
taken a secondary role in historians’ studies of the Cold War.
 The attention of Mexican political historians, on the 
other hand, has only recently begun to transition from the revo-
lutionary era to the post-revolutionary period. Popular themes 
for analysis include the formation and limits of the modern 
Mexican state, the nature of political representation, the cre-
ation of political parties, the character of local and national 
elections, and the correlation between dissent and violence. 
In the context of the Cold War, the literature has centered on 
the presence of communists in Mexico, the nation’s relation-
ship with the Soviet Union, how the international context in-
fluenced domestic policies, and how the United States’ for-
eign policy objectives limited the Mexican presidents’ power.9
 Neither group of scholars, however, has extensively ex-
amined why Mexico’s unwillingness to match Washington’s anti-
communist fervor did not cause significant conflict between the 
two nations - especially given their geopolitical and economic 
proximity. In an effort to fill the aforementioned holes in the 
historiography, this paper utilizes a collection of declassified 
documents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) along-
side archives from the State Department to investigate why the 
United States did not chastise Mexico for sustaining relations 
with Cuba after the OAS Resolution of 1964. More broadly, this 
paper seeks to shift scholars’ attention towards the relationship 
between the United States and Mexico, and how the Cold War 
impacted it. It first examines Mexico’s domestic front, analyzing 
how the factious nature of the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) and the personal interest of individual politicians shaped 
Washington policy makers’ understanding of Mexico’s relation-
ship with Cuba. Afterwards, it evaluates the hemispheric impact 
of Mexico’s decision to maintain relations with Cuba, noting 
the United States’ concern with Cuba’s utilization of Mexico as 
a base to export subversives to the Latin American mainland. 
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Ultimately, I argue, the United States decided to not reprimand 
Mexico for its decision to retain economic and diplomatic re-
lations with Cuba because the bilateral relationship did not 
threaten to spread communism – not to Mexico or to other 
nations in Latin America. Washington bureaucrats recognized 
that Mexico’s opposition to the OAS resolution originated from 
considerations on party stability and prioritization of personal 
interests. They understood Mexico’s decision not as a direct af-
front to their ardent anticommunist agenda but as a continu-
ance of traditional political behaviors. In understanding Mexico’s 
characteristic political behaviors and respecting their deviation 
from the hemispheric foreign policy, the United States was able 
to strengthen the country’s ability to combat communism with-
in its borders. Mexico’s relationship with Cuba not only posed 
a minimal threat of spreading communism, but it could actu-
ally have the power to prevent its dissemination. The United 
States, therefore, had minimal reason to chastise its neighbor, 
and rather had every reason to quietly support its decision.
Mexico’s Domestic Front: The Protection of the PRI 
 Paradoxically, in allowing Mexico to retain its relation-
ship with Cuba the United States strengthened Mexico’s primary 
political party and its ability to resist communism. By 1964, the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had monopolized the 
political system of Mexico for nearly four decades. The CIA rec-
ognized that the party’s subsumption of “groups ranging from the 
far left to the extreme right”  allowed it to control “almost all ele-
ments of Mexican society” and break “the power of those it could 
not absorb.”10 They identified the PRI’s broad coalition build-
ing, in other words, as the key electoral mechanism that allowed 
the political party to preserve its monopolistic power. To build 
stability between the ranging sectors within the party system, 
the outgoing president always chose his heir to prevent internal 
fights over succession, thus maintaining the party unity neces-
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sary to emerge victorious at the polls. Additionally, the PRI did 
not tolerate any external challenge to its rule and quickly moved 
to suppress any opposition –from communists or otherwise. 11
 An overview of the PRI clearly indicates why a neigh-
bor with a stable one party dictatorship provided great conve-
nience for the United States. Not only did Washington not have 
to worry about an imminent communist threat on its border, 
but it also rested at ease knowing that one of the most influential 
countries in Latin America would not easily fall prey to com-
munism. Hence, so long as the PRI retained their monopolistic 
power, the United States could trust that Mexico’s foreign policy 
decisions would not result in an internal collapse to communism. 
When the end of his term approached in 1964, President Ad-
olfo Lopez Mateos had to reconcile conflicting factions when 
selecting his successor, like all previous PRI presidents had 
done. Unlike his predecessors, however, Lopez Mateos had to 
cater to an additional interest - the United States and the Lyn-
don B. Johnson administration. Earlier in the year, Johnson 
had pressured the outgoing president to align Mexico more 
closely with American foreign policy, creating tension between 
the two nations. In a conversation between the two presidents 
in February of 1964, Lopez Mateos admitted that “a number 
of recent events had led his country to adopt certain interna-
tional policies which had been interpreted by some people as 
anti-American.”12 Johnson, subtly pressuring Mexico into com-
pliance, responded that “he was sure that when the chips were 
down Mexico would be on the side of the United States.”13
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 The primary goal of United States foreign policy since 
the beginning of the Cold War lay in impeding the expansion 
of communism. In the Western Hemisphere, American bureau-
crats believed they would achieve this through the isolation 
of Cuba with OAS initiatives.14 Utilizing the OAS to advance 
their goals had dominated the United States’ hemispheric 
policy even before the Johnson Administration. Since 1960, 
before Castro had declared himself a communist, the State De-
partment actively sought to “impress upon Latin American the 
nature and seriousness of Communist penetration of Cuba.”15 
The United States repeatedly emphasized that the dangerous 
problem required preventative hemispheric action in the form 
of every member’s severance of relations with the island. 
 The United States first formally attempted to achieve 
this objective by expelling Cuba from the OAS. But key nations 
- such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico – opposed the measure. 
Consequently, the American delegation resorted to the bribing 
of right wing Central American dictators to secure the passage 
of the resolution. Washington officials, therefore, viewed the 
vote as an insincere and indifferent notion from Latin Ameri-
can countries to espouse its concerns with communism.16 
From left to right: Presidents Truman, Johnson and 
Lopez-Mateos in a meeting in 1959
Source: Wikimedia commons, National Park Service
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 To remedy this, Washington policy makers sought to 
use Venezuela’s condemnation of Cuba’s support for commu-
nist uprisings in its territory to emphasize the danger that Cu-
ba’s communist interventions posed. In doing so, they hoped 
to arouse the animosity needed to pass an OAS resolution that 
would force Latin American nations to suspend relations with 
Cuba. Shortly before Johnson’s meeting with Lopez Mateos, 
internal deliberations in the State Department between Assis-
tant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann, OAS 
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Special Coordinator for Cu-
ban Affairs John Crimmins, and others concluded that “while 
the Venezuelans should publicly lead the fight, we will have to 
give them plenty of support [through] an intensive selling job 
in Latin America.”17 Part of this “selling job,” would include 
“making noise” about Cuba’s intervention in Venezuela. But 
more importantly, the United States had to aid in the drafting 
of Venezuela’s resolution. This resolution would condemn Cu-
ba’s interventionism and recommend that OAS members sever 
relations with the nation. By taking such an intimate role in the 
process, the United States aimed to ensure that the vote on the 
OAS resolution would result in the accomplishment of its most 
pressing objective in the Western Hemisphere - containing the 
spread of communism.18 In light of these circumstances, John-
son - in his meeting with Lopez Mateos - alluded to the upcom-
ing OAS vote. He characterized it as a time when the meta-
phorical chips would be put down, and made it clear the United 
States expected Mexico’s loyal support in this critical time.
Mexico’s Domestic Front: Factionalism in the PRI
 As this unfolded on the international stage, Lopez Ma-
teos selected Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, his Minister of the Interior, 
as his successor. Described as “severe in dealing with com-
munist agitation during his tenure” by the Washington Daily 
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News, and as farther to the right than his predecessor by the 
CIA, the choice pleased the Johnson administration. Fulton 
Freeman, the American ambassador to Mexico, spoke ap-
provingly of the reports that Diaz Ordaz would win.19 When 
internal PRI opposition commented on this statement, upset 
at the prospect that the United States would aid their disfa-
vored candidate, neither Secretary Mann nor President John-
son chastised Freeman for supporting the wrong candidate 
but rather advised him on how to manage the backlash from 
Mexican press.20 The United States government, clearly ap-
proved of Lopez Mateos’ selection and viewed Diaz Ordaz 
as a candidate who would continue the PRI’s monopoly on 
Mexican politics. More importantly, Diaz Ordaz could poten-
tially act more decisively against communist groups than his 
predecessor because of his political standing, which further 
ruled out any significant communist challenge in Mexico. 21
 This choice, however, did not please all factions of 
the PRI – the left wing members of the party, led by former 
president Lazaro Cardenas, opposed the nomination of Diaz 
Ordaz. In addition to their disapproval of Diaz Ordaz’s stance 
on domestic policy issues, they also took issue with his en-
dorsement of the OAS resolution, as they assumed the in-
coming administration would follow its predecessor’s ex-
ample.22 Shortly before Mexico’s presidential elections and 
the vote on the OAS resolution, Secretary Mann described 
his trouble with securing Mexico’s vote in support for the 
resolution as stemming from this factious dispute. Mann in-
formed Johnson that while Mexico’s OAS ambassador Vi-
cente Sanchez Gavito stood on their side, he was working 
arduously to “trying to keep the party from splitting” over 
the language of the OAS resolution right before the election. 
 As Sanchez Gavito participated in deliberations where 
he fiddled “with words that everybody [could] live with,” 
members of the Johnson administration, including Assistant 
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for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, acknowl-
edged that the factious bickering could prevent the US from 
securing Mexico’s vote.23 The Johnson administration, in 
short, understood how the PRI’s internal disputes affected 
Mexico’s foreign policy decisions in the OAS and decided 
to not force Mexico to vote in favor of the resolution. In do-
ing so, the Johnson administration chose to give Lopez Ma-
teos the room he needed to work on keeping his party united 
– a decision that in the long term would benefit the United 
States as it would allow the PRI to retain its dominance.
 The elections in Mexico resulted with Diaz Ordaz’s 
victory, but they did not end the factious tensions in the PRI. 
The newly elected president had to take care to appease the 
leftist faction in order to keep the party intact. The Diaz Or-
daz administration consequently chose to maintain Mexico’s 
disapproval of the OAS resolution, specifically voicing ob-
jection to the resolution’s “mandatory language” which obli-
gated member countries dissolve their relations with Cuba.24 
Therefore, when put into context, Mexico’s disapproval of the 
resolution indicates that one of the following two scenarios 
played out. Either inner party conflicts persisted in plaguing 
the PRI and Diaz Ordaz continued to negotiate with the left-
ist faction that initially opposed the resolution, or Diaz Or-
daz sacrificed his own position on the resolution and opposed 
it to appease the leftist faction and keep the party united.
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 In an attempt to secure Mexico’s vote and help the PRI 
leaders unite the party, the United States rewrote the language 
of the resolution on multiple occasions.25 But in the end, it did 
not come as a surprise to the American delegation when Mexi-
co voted against the resolution. As alluded to previously, Wash-
ington bureaucrats’ restraint in exercising retaliatory measures 
against Mexico for its vote against the OAS resolution reflect-
ed their understanding of the internal conflicts of the PRI as 
well as the United States’ own priorities in hemispheric policy. 
The Johnson administration primarily helped orchestrate the 
passage of the 1964 OAS resolution as a preventative measure 
to limit Cuba’s ability to catalyze communist revolutions in 
the mainland of Latin America. When it came to achieving 
this goal in Mexico, however, the nation’s affirmative vote on 
the resolution only supplied symbolic significance, whereas 
the continued control of the PRI provided practical protec-
tion. If Mexico’s opposition to the OAS resolution, thus, was 
the cost of precluding factious disputes in the PRI from split-
ting the party and ending its monopoly, the United States was 
Presidents Diaz-Ordaz and Johnson
Source: Yoichi Okamoto via Wikimedia Com-
mons
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willing to pay it in the name of the same goal that motivated 
it to support the OAS resolution in the first place: suppress-
ing all potential for communist expansion in Latin America
.
Mexico’s Domestic Front:     
Personal Interests as the Ulterior Motive  
 The trajectory of corruption in Mexican politics in the 
decades leading up to the OAS vote in 1964 demonstrated that 
in addition to factious disputes, personal agendas also sig-
nificantly shaped Mexico’s foreign policy decisions. Public 
statements made by Mexican politicians on the OAS resolu-
tion offer a glimpse into this pattern. For instance, Sanchez 
Gavito  reportedly “startled the New World diplomatic corps” 
at the OAS in arguing that “‘the Mexican government may 
fall’ if Mexico abandons its pro-Cuba policy.”26 Such an ex-
aggerated statement undoubtedly served as a rhetorical strat-
egy to justify Mexico’s position and possibly garner sympathy 
from the other OAS ambassadors, as the economic policies of 
Mexico at the time clearly disprove the veracity of the state-
ment. Mexico would significantly suffer from severing rela-
tions with Cuba if ending the relationship signified the loss 
of a significant source of critical imports or revenue from ex-
ports. Yet since the presidency of Manuel Avila Camacho in 
1940, Mexico had adhered to the Import Substitution Industri-
alization Model (ISI).  At the time of the presidency of Lopez 
Mateos, Mexico remained in the second phase of this plan; 
this second phase required the implementation of harsh tariffs 
to protect local industry from foreign competition and allowed 
domestic development to burgeon. Put simply, this meant that 
Mexico did not rely on Cuban imports.27 Cuba, similarly, did 
not serve as a primary destination for Mexico’s exports.28 
 Despite the lack of veracity of Sanchez Gavito’s 
claims, the official actions of the Mexican government sup-
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port the ambassador’s suggestion that the Mexican govern-
ment valued trade with the island. On two occasions, Mexico 
ignored the OAS’s sanctions on Cuba – it first rejected the 
OAS resolution of June 1964 cutting all economic ties with 
the island and afterwards, it refused to sign the OAS sanc-
tions adopted in July of 1964.29 Mexico’s reluctance to adopt 
the measures ratified by the OAS allowed the country, as a 
Mexican diplomat put it, to serve “as a window” to the state 
of Cuba.30 As more accurately articulated by the Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Mexico served as a “gateway to Cuba –  the 
only entry point through which people and cargo [could] get 
into Cuba from the Western Hemisphere on a regular basis.”31 
Through this “gateway” role, Mexico facilitated the smug-
gling of contraband, serving as “a chief avenue through which 
machinery parts and other supplies desperately needed by 
Cuba” were smuggled from the United States. Mexico, more-
over, served as a passageway for Soviet aid to reach the island. 
A Mexican company, for instance, reportedly “sold to the So-
viet Union a million tons of sulphur which will be transferred 
to Cuba for use in that country’s sugar refining industry.”32
 When taken together, these factors - Mexico’s limited 
national economic exchanges with Cuba,  the high rhetorical 
value Mexican officials placed on maintaining this relation-
ship, the regular embezzlement of funds and the smuggling of 
goods to the island - suggest that PRI politicians potentially 
kept economic relations with Cuba to personally benefit from 
the profits generated by the illicit trade with the island. The 
high value Mexican politicians placed on trade with Cuba also 
insinuates that the commodities smuggled went beyond the 
machinery and sulphur mentioned by the newspaper articles. 
Smugglers likely transported other supplies critical to Cuba’s 
survival sourced from within Mexico, such as oil, given the 
lucrative profits available. These profits would have substan-
tially increased given that the OAS resolution hindered the is-
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land’s economic survival by demanding that the other members 
cut off economic ties with Cuba – the smugglers, therefore, 
would have held a near monopoly over trade with the island. 
 The relationship between PRI politicians of the late 
20th century and smugglers parallels the relationship shared 
by the modern PRI and drug cartels. In both eras, politicians 
demonstrated a willingness to create political conditions fa-
vorable to the smugglers’ transfers in return for a share of the 
profits. Greed and a desire for personal wealth, in other words, 
could have shaped Mexico’s foreign policy decisions in regard 
to Cuba. One could argue that the close relationship between 
the PRI and smugglers does not parallel, but rather served as a 
precedent for the modern dynamic between the PRI and drug 
cartels. In allowing contrabandists to move goods through 
Mexico while disregarding international agreements, the ad-
ministration of López Mateos paved the way for future PRI 
politicians and technocrats to accept agreements with drug 
cartels if it meant personal gain. The manipulation of the po-
litical context surrounding Cuba by PRI politicians adds yet 
another example of the enduring political party’s corruption. 
 Even if individual PRI politicians did not have direct 
contact with smugglers, politicians did not need intimate con-
nections to obtain profits from illicit commerce with Cuba. 
Corrupt PRI technocrats could have easily used their busi-
ness connections at the time to obtain a share of the revenue 
made by Mexican companies, such as the ones that illegally 
sold sulphur to the island.33 These new opportunities for rev-
enue that Mexican companies found through their country’s 
unique trading position with the island multiplied the oppor-
tunities for Mexican politicians to skim off the revenue that 
the government made from tariffs. PRI politicians, in short, 
had a vested personal interest in maintaining a source of rev-
enue which was uncontested by the rest of the hemisphere and 
did not hesitate to use their governmental power to protect it.
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 The United States government recognized the per-
sonalist motivations of Mexican politicians and accepted this 
corruption as a mechanism that helped maintain the PRI’s 
power.34 Though no State Department memorandum explic-
itly articulated it, the foreign policy team of President Johnson 
could have arrived at this same conclusion from their familiar-
ity with the inner workings of Mexican politics. Washington 
policy makers, in other words, inherently framed their reac-
tion to Mexico’s retainment of relations with Cuba with the 
knowledge of how personal interests influenced Mexican pol-
icy. In understanding this dynamic, Mexico’s refusal to accept 
the OAS resolution played out not as intransigence against 
the United States’ anticommunist agenda, but as a continua-
tion of long standing relationships between politicians, Mexi-
can companies, and smugglers. Therefore, the preservation 
of the bilateral relations between Mexico and Cuba presented 
no immediate affront to the United States’ objective of pre-
venting communist insurrections. Washington, consequently, 
had no pressing reason to reproach Mexico for its decision. 
Hemispheric Scale: Securing   
the Mainland through Preventative Measures 
 While the Johnson administration worried about Mex-
ico’s internal collapse to communism, it fretted more over Cu-
ba’s potential to utilize Mexico as a base to launch its efforts 
to support communist uprisings in Latin America. The regular 
efforts of Cuban diplomats in Mexico to stimulate revolution-
aries in Nicaragua in the years leading up to the Cuban Missile 
Crisis made this threat seem more imminent.35 Acknowledge-
ment of these activities affected the way in which members of 
the National Security Council participated in the drafting of 
Venezuela’s OAS resolution. They emphasized the importance 
of cutting transportation between Cuba and mainland Latin 
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America to prevent Cuba from further instigating revolution-
ary efforts in the continent. Special Assistant for National Se-
curity Affairs Gordon Chase, for instance, supported the OAS 
resolution calling “for the suspension of all air and sea commu-
nications between Cuba and OAS countries,” noting that such 
a measure would cut “the Cuba/Mexico airlink” and signifi-
cantly hinder Cuba’s ability to export subversives.36 Mexico, 
as mentioned, did not vote in favor of this resolution, nor did it 
cut its air link to Cuba, which meant it could still act as a launch 
pad for Cuban subversives into the mainland of Latin America. 
 Despite American politicians’ concern over Cuba’s po-
tential utilization of Mexico as a base to export communist 
guerillas, the political and diplomatic developments ensured 
that this threat was unlikely to materialize. Though Washing-
ton knew that the PRI would swiftly suppress any challenge to 
its rule, the more conservative character of the new Diaz Or-
daz administration added additional assurance that any com-
munist challenge would be quashed . William Raborn, Direc-
tor of the CIA, in a memorandum on the security conditions in 
Mexico described the political course of Diaz Ordaz as “to the 
right of his predecessor,” as he catered to the “moderate and 
conservative elements in the PRI [who] were exerting pressure 
to restrict the influence of Castroites, Communists, and other 
extremists.”37 Moreover, the same CIA memorandum on se-
curity conditions in Mexico noted that the administration had 
successfully “sharply limited pro-Castroite and other anti-US 
activities.”38 Mexico, in other words, would not serve as a fruit-
ful base for Fidel Castro’s efforts to export communist upris-
ings to the mainland of Latin America. The Diaz Ordaz admin-
istration – more than any of its predecessors – would subdue 
communist guerillas within Mexico’s borders before they had 
a chance to spread their influence elsewhere in the mainland.
 Aside from the heightened dedication of the Mexican 
government to crack down on any domestic or Cuban commu-
97    Victoria Saeki-Serna
Mexico’s Cuban Connection
nist activities in its territory, the United States ensured that no 
Cuban effort to export revolutionaries would succeed by rein-
forcing the defenses of the rest of the continent. Not only did the 
United States succeed in limiting the possibility of Castro send-
ing subversives to the mainland by orchestrating the ratifica-
tion of the OAS resolution - it went a step further by increasing 
military and economic aid to the countries most vulnerable to 
a communist attack. After the Johnson administration realized 
that Mexico would not suspend its relations with Cuba after 
the ratification of the resolution, it shifted its focus to protect-
ing the governments of Central America. While anticommu-
nist dictators and parties controlled the governments of El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua with aid from the 
United States, their rule was considerably less stable than that 
of the PRI’s.39 This fragility, alongside their geographical prox-
imity to Mexico, made these countries more vulnerable targets 
if a Cuban communist excursion established itself in Mexico. 
Accordingly, the Johnson administration increased both mili-
tary and economic aid to these countries to reinforce their ability 
to repress communist insurrections. From 1964 to 1965, indi-
vidual aid increased by $3,297,000 to El Salvador, $2,732,000 
to Guatemala, $3,742,000 to Honduras, and $17,982,000 to 
Nicaragua.40 Additionally, less than a year after the OAS voted 
on requiring member nations to cease relations with Cuba, the 
United States helped to establish the Central American Defense 
Council, otherwise known as CONDECA. A mutual defense al-
liance, CONDECA ensured countries would come to the aid of 
any member troubled by communist insurgencies in their terri-
tory. Washington officials also provided anti-guerilla training 
to the militaries of these Central American countries with the 
goal of better preparing them to suppress any communist upris-
ings – especially those which sprouted from Cuban support.41
 The United States, in other words, took preventa-
tive measures in Central America to minimize the influence 
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of Cuban communism through both stick and carrot mea-
sures. Increasing economic aid to these countries served as 
a carrot, allowing Washington to curb a rise in sympathy for 
communism among Central Americans by ameliorating the 
economic conditions of these countries. Fortifying the mili-
taries of Central America with a larger budget and improved 
military training against communist insurgencies served as 
a stick, ensuring that the extant governments stood a better 
chance of defeating Cuban sympathizing subversives if they 
attempted to foment an uprising. Should Cuban subversives 
even succeed in leaving Mexico, the geographic areas most 
likely to become targets of their operations now stood bet-
ter prepared to withstand their challenge. Because of the im-
plementation of these safeguards, the United States did not 
overly concern itself with the prospect of a communist revo-
lution carried out by Cuban subversives in Central America. 
Therefore, the Mexico-Cuba relationship posed a minimal 
threat of spreading communism to Latin America as a whole. 
Conclusion 
 The United States did not reprimand Mexico for re-
taining its relationship with Cuba because their connection, 
contrary to initial appearances, furthered the United States’ 
primary foreign policy goal: containing the spread of com-
munism. In fact, the Mexico-Cuba relationship reduced fac-
tionalist debates, ensured the continued dominance of the PRI, 
and reduced the possibility that Mexico would fall to commu-
nism. Moreover, Washington diplomats likely considered the 
influence of the personal interests of politicians as a source of 
Mexico’s foreign policy decisions. Mexico’s relationship with 
Cuba provided lucrative opportunities that gave technocrats an 
incentive to remain in power. Taking these factors into consid-
eration, the United States construed Mexico’s connection with 
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Cuba not as an affront to their ardent anticommunist agenda, but 
rather as an indicator of the continued influence of individual 
interests within the Mexican system. Both Mexican and Amer-
ican policy makers, moreover, swiftly moved to preclude com-
munist insurrections catalyzed by Cuban subversives – through 
harsher internal crack downs and the allocation of additional 
aid to Latin American countries with more vulnerable political 
systems, respectively. Any attempts from Cuba to utilize Mex-
ico as a base to export communist revolutions into mainland 
Latin America, consequently, stood little chance of success. 
An analysis between the relationship between Mexico and 
Cuba, in conclusion, reveals that this connection would not 
spread communism to Mexico or any country in the Latin 
American mainland. Instead, it strengthened Mexico’s ability 
to fight communism within its borders, which in turn prevent-
ed the spread of communism into the rest of Latin America. 
Requiring Mexico to abide by the OAS resolution would at 
best serve as a symbolic measure, and at worst, would damage 
Mexico’s ability to fight communism. Allowing for Mexico 
to carry out an independent foreign policy decision, on the 
other hand, served as a practical measure which achieved the 
primary objective of Washington’s foreign policy – prevent-
ing Cuba’s communist agenda from contaminating the rest of 
the hemisphere. For these reasons, the United States had no 
reason to retaliate against its neighbor for sustaining relations 
with Cuba; rather, it had every reason to support its decision.
 On its own, Mexico fulfilled the guarantees that the United 
States sought from every other OAS member through the 
ratification of Venezuela’s resolution. Through the steadfast 
domination of the PRI, Mexico proved to Washington that it 
would neither collapse to communism nor stimulate its surge 
in neighboring countries. In satisfying the principal goal of 
the United States – the suppression of all communist expan-
sion – prior to the resolution, Mexico did not have to abide by 
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the course of action that Washington diplomats dictated. This 
enabled Mexico to retain a higher level of autonomy over its 
foreign policy than the rest of the OAS member nations. In-
deed, as President Johnson expected, when all the chips were 
down Mexico was on the United States’ side - but this did not 
occur primarily from a premeditated choice. Ultimately, both 
Mexico’s trustworthiness and higher degree of international 
autonomy were unintended side effects of the one party dic-
tatorship built around the PRI’s greed and desire for power.
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Truman (Left) and the President of Mexico Adolfo López Mateos (Right), 
in 1959., 1959, National Park Service [1], https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Mateos.jpg.
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Yoichi Okamoto, President Lyndon B. Johnson Hosts the President of 
Mexico Gustavo Diaz Ordaz at His Texas Ranch, November 10, 1964, 
November 10, 1964, LBJ Library, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:LBJ_and_Diaz_Ordaz.jpg.
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Ptolemaic - Egyptian Collaboration 
and the Weak state problem
Alan Clingan (University of Maryland -- College 
Park)
 Egypt, after its conquest by the Persians in 525 BCE, 
appeared as an appendage on the map of the ancient world. After 
millennia of near-constant indigenous reign, Egypt’s leader was a 
foreigner who did not reside in Egypt. But the end of Alexander’s 
empire gave rise to the Greek-speaking Ptolemaic dynasty in 305 
BCE, and with it a pharaoh residing in Egypt. The rise of the 
Ptolemies is unique among the Macedonian successor states. 
The inherent foreignness of the Ptolemies and their court had 
to be made presentable to the Egyptian population. Egyptian 
bureaucracy survived through both the Persians and Alexander 
but had to be controlled and tamed to prevent uprisings and 
threats to foreign power. With a pharaoh fully residing in Egypt 
this became even more imperative. The Ptolemaic dynasty 
had to exercise control through all the levels of administration 
down to the local populace, but they had to prevent both the 
mostly-Egyptian populace from rising against them and the 
Greek settlers who accompanied the Ptolemies. Compromises 
were made and the Egyptian populace was amenable to them, 
but ultimately forces outside of the Ptolemies’ grasp undid their 
strength. Their form of rule, one which worked well for the first 
three Ptolemaic pharaohs, inhibited them from being able to 
respond effectively when larger crises hit. The early Ptolemaic 
administration revolved around a weak state that exercised power 
by substantial collaboration with the Egyptians and lower-level 
administrators.
PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS
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 Previous understandings of the Ptolemaic state emphasized 
the role of irresponsible pharaohs. While there is general 
consensus that the first few Ptolemies were effective and efficient 
rulers, the common explanation for the lackluster performance of 
their successors usually given is simple recklessness. Exemplifying 
this standard view perfectly, Monica Anemi, a classicist focusing 
on North Africa and Egypt, has written, “[after Ptolemy III,] 
Succeeding Ptolemies became obsessed with power that they 
failed to take responsibility for Egypt and her people. Therefore, 
a gradual deterioration of political power and influence became 
inevitable.”1 She espouses a division of the Ptolemaic dynasty 
into two parts: the old, good Ptolemies versus the young, bad 
Ptolemies. The early Ptolemies became upstanding warrior-
pharaohs while the later Ptolemies were reduced to gluttonous 
sloth-pharaohs. This conceptualization runs much deeper and 
older within Ptolemaic scholarship than the statement of a single 
classicist. In the second century BCE, Polybius described Ptolemy 
IV (r. 221-204 BCE) as, “absorbed in unworthy intrigues, 
and senseless and continual drunkenness.”2 These descriptors 
thus make the collapse of the Ptolemaic dynasty the failings of 
individuals.
 This interpretation is appealing in its narrative simplicity, 
and offers an inspiring story of rebellion against despotic rule. 
It paints the Ptolemies as rulers who overstayed their welcome. 
Despite hard-working beginnings they were corrupted by power. 
Their tyrannical rule oppressed the Egyptian majority. The 
Ptolemies overplayed their hand, forcefully disrupting Egypt 
to a point where revolution rang in the air. The later rebellions 
were the will of the people overthrowing their oppressors. The 
rebellions were seen as evidence of the failing Ptolemaic state. 
These claims function, however, only under the assumption that 
the Ptolemaic state was tyrannical enough to provoke rebellion, 
yet not tyrannical enough to suppress rebellion. The evidence 
most often used in favor of this view is the revolt immediately after 
the Battle of Raphia. Scholars have long assumed that this battle 
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was the first time Egyptian troops were used alongside Greek 
troops, a point that will be disproved below. Despite winning the 
battle, the Ptolemaic dynasty was rocked by the Great Revolt. 
As Polybius wrote, “By arming the Egyptians for his war against 
Antiochos, Ptolemy [IV] had an excellent idea for the short time, 
but he did not take into account the future. Priding themselves 
upon their victory at Raphia, the soldiers were no longer disposed 
to obey orders.”3 The Great Revolt was seen as the watershed, 
dividing the pre-Raphia good Ptolemies from the post-Raphia 
bad Ptolemies. This sentiment continues to be echoed: writing in 
2016, Hans Hauben, a historian of the ancient world wrote that 
it is important not to “play down the national(istic) factor [of the 
post-Raphia rebellion].”4 These interpretations rely on the belief 
that the Egyptians were oppressed and, once trained and armed, 
took advantage of the opportunity to assail their oppressor. Yet 
these explanations ignore the complex realities of political power 
which the later Ptolemaic pharaohs faced.
 Instead of a tyrannical oppressive state domineering the 
Egyptian population until they broke in revolt, it is possible the 
Ptolemaic state was not tyrannically oppressive. The rebellions 
that threatened the Ptolemaic state were perhaps caused by forces 
outside of the control of the Ptolemies rather than instigated by 
a decadent Ptolemaic tyrant. It is possible, too, that the difficulty 
in suppressing the later rebellions were not due to the scale of 
Egyptian hatred for their Ptolemaic overlords, but because 
the Ptolemaic state was weak. The older formulations of the 
Ptolemaic state hardly considered these possibilities, but when 
evaluating the evidence, it becomes clear that the Ptolemaic state 
was not an oppressively tyrannical one, whose heavy-handed 
actions accidentally instigated rebellions and found itself unable 
to suppress them because of their sheer scale. Rather it is evident 
that the Ptolemaic state relied on substantial collaboration with 
the Egyptians before rebellions instigated by factors outside 
their control exposed the fact the Ptolemaic state was weak 
because it had over-relied on the Egyptian populace. To prove 
Penn History Review     110 
Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration
this interpretation it is necessary to evaluate all the interactions 
between the Ptolemaic state and the native Egyptians. 
PTOLEMAIC-EGYPTIAN COLLABORATION
 The Egyptian population assisted the Ptolemaic 
administration by enforcing its law. By assisting the 
administration, the Egyptians would have gained some agency 
over their own lives, yet they did not immediately turn this agency 
against the Ptolemies. The most visible members of Ptolemaic 
state bureaucracy would have been administrators functioning 
as law enforcement. Interestingly, where the majority of the 
population was Egyptian, Egyptian law enforcement officers 
predominated. Nearly all written records show law enforcement 
officers as having Egyptian names.5 These local officers themselves 
relied heavily on the population they were overseeing in order 
to carry out their tasks. When law enforcement required it, the 
local officer would call upon the local populace to help track 
down those evading justice and stolen property.6 This utilization 
of the local population as the arm of the law under official 
sanction by the local officer was rather similar to what later 
legal traditions would call a Posse comitatus, or in more common 
parlance, a posse. Given the fact that it was necessary to call 
upon the populace for enforcing the law, it would be reasonable 
to deduce that the Egyptian administration, at least at the local 
level, lacked manpower. There existed a wide range of positions 
among the local administrators, but each administrator, rather 
than being assigned to a narrow purview, was tasked with a wide 
range of responsibilities. They supervised projects, conducted 
investigations, and assisted in tax collection on top of their 
law enforcement duties.7 This broad purview left a substantial 
portion of law enforcement work to fall to the citizens. It could 
have been problematic to rely on the populace to enforce the law 
upon local administrators’ request, as if the Egyptians refused to 
assist the administration it would have lost the ability to enforce 
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the law. Yet the system was successful and the native population 
worked with the administration in assisting the Ptolemies. 
Despite having the means to, the Egyptians did not consistently 
oppose the Ptolemaic rule, indicating some level of collaboration 
between the two parties.
 The Ptolemaic bureaucracy, through its structure, 
functioned to ingrain itself within the population. For the 
average Egyptian and the lowest administrators, life under the 
Ptolemies carried on as it did before. Egyptians were allowed to 
retain much of their previous legal structure. Different laws and 
legal systems existed for the Greeks and the Egyptian populations 
even in 126 BCE.8 Even the language used at the lowest levels 
remained Egyptian.9 In Egyptian tradition, the pharaoh was 
an active participant in legal matters and the apex of any legal 
appeal.10 Decisions made by a lower official could in theory be 
appealed up ultimately to the pharaoh. Rules and judgment 
were inherently within the powers of pharaoh, even the pharaoh 
himself lived within a tightly rule-bound tradition.11 This 
continued and expanded under the Ptolemies. Voluminous letters 
and petitions flew directly from the populace to the Ptolemies, 
the highest reaches of the bureaucracy, or even to any individual 
thought by the sender to have some measures of influence. Low 
administrators petitioned Ptolemy III (r. 246-222 BCE) for debt 
relief.12 Unpaid soldiers wrote to commanders up the chain of 
command.13 A tax collector’s Greek assistant received petitions 
for the release of a criminal.14 Examples such as these abound 
in primary sources. While many of the appeals did not reach 
the person to whom they were addressed, the Ptolemies tried to 
display themselves as just. Despite Polybius’s claim that Ptolemy 
IV was wasteful and given to weakness, he managed to find his 
emphasis on justice and mercy commendable.15 This concept that 
the pharaoh was always available as a course of appeal, especially 
after the rule by the distant Persians, would have given hope to 
the average Egyptian and tied them closer to the Ptolemies. 
 Taxes played a substantial role in Ptolemaic policy towards 
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the Egyptian population and proved to be a major point of 
collaboration. The system of taxation in Egypt historically relied 
on land and routed the payments though the temples up through 
the temple bureaucracy to the pharaoh. This taxation structure was 
kept intact by the Ptolemies.16 Tax breaks were granted to soldiers 
to encourage loyalty, and expressions of mercy and clemency 
would often be accompanied by broad temporary lessening of 
taxes.17 The temples and priests, as collectors of the taxes, were 
exempt from taxes.18 Broad swaths of the population faced 
lessened tax burdens in an attempt to gain loyalty.19 Information 
about taxes, how much to collect and from whom to collect, 
did not come from supreme order of the higher bureaucracy, 
but from the lower levels of administration upwards.20 Given 
the reluctance of the Ptolemies to utilize Egyptian troops many 
foreigners had to be enticed to volunteer in the Ptolemaic military 
by promises of substantial pay.21 The ability of the Ptolemies to 
grant such large tax exemptions, both periodically to all and in 
perpetuity to certain groups, along with the importance taxes 
played in hiring the foreign soldiers upon which the Ptolemies 
depended on hints at another important source of Ptolemaic 
income: plunder. The Ptolemies did not seem keen on world-
conquest as Alexander was or on resurrecting Alexander’s empire 
as other successor states were, but when in battle, plunder was 
often a goal. This was a pattern throughout early Ptolemaic rule. 
Ptolemy I’s conquests in Anatolia ended with him selling the 
plunder, while Ptolemy IV, after achieving objectives, did not 
translate his success in battle into further conquests.22 Plundering 
and the lack of desire for conquest mutually go together. After 
all, if the king intends on ruling the land, plundering would be 
effectively stealing from the king, as Cyrus infamously discovered 
in the Siege of Sardis.23 Through plunder, the Ptolemies were 
able to lessen the tax burden, thereby gaining loyalty, while 
maintaining the army upon which they relied, but this came at 
the expense of long-term conquest outside Egypt.24 Perhaps the 
Ptolemies never desired long-term conquest outside of Egypt at 
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all, but their policies of emphasis on plunder prevented it even if 
they wanted to conquer.25
 The temples, as a major cog in the bureaucratic machine, 
had to be supported by the Ptolemies. But given the importance 
of temples within Egyptian culture, the Ptolemies had to appear 
sincere in their actions towards the temples and the temple’s 
bureaucracy.26 This they did through actions, performed in 
rituals, and words, such as dedications and decrees.27 The temple 
priests, beyond their role as temple officials of the Ptolemaic state, 
also supplied officers to the Ptolemaic military.28 Around 15% of 
Ptolemaic military officers were Egyptian and about 30% of those 
directly held priestly offices.29 An unknown number of Ptolemaic 
Egyptian military officers had ties to the priestly bureaucracy but 
did not directly hold priestly ranks. These figures were determined 
through analysis of letters, names, and military burials but both of 
these percentages increased as Ptolemaic rule continued.30 Given 
the importance of tax collection, which was the domain of the 
temple, on the functioning of the military, this tied, in a bottom-
up fashion, the priestly elites to the Ptolemies. But the co-opting 
of the temples also functioned in a top-down method. Ptolemaic 
pharaohs from Ptolemy II (r. 283-246 BCE) onward created new 
temples, cults, and rituals surrounding members of the Ptolemaic 
dynasty.31 Any expansion of the religious infrastructure of Egypt 
would have necessitated an expansion in the temple bureaucracy 
to maintain the new temples, practice the new cults, and perform 
the new rituals. This would have swelled the bureaucratic ranks 
of the temple with priests tied to the Ptolemies for the security of 
their occupation.
Relief from Philae depicting Ptolemy I, dressed as an Egyptian 
pharaoh, bearing gifts for the Egyptian goddess Hathor. Evident 
is the utilization of the Ptolemies of traditional Egyptian sym-
bolism and traditions.
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 Key in Ptolemaic policy towards temples was not only 
maintenance of native Egyptian religion, but also an active 
movement towards reconciling Egyptian and Greek beliefs. The 
creation of the god Serapis brings this to light. Serapis was a 
combination of the Egyptian bull-god Apis and numerous other 
attributes more often associated with Greek divinities.32 Many 
attributes of Greek divinities were combined with attributes 
of Egyptian divinities. For example, “aspects of the father god 
and saviour god Zeus and the underworld god Pluto were also 
merged with aspects of the fertility god Dionysos and the healing 
god Asklepios” to create an entirely new divinity for both the 
Egyptians and Greeks.33 Serapis was promoted, expanding beyond 
the popularity of the previous popular bull cult surrounding 
Apis, to be seen as a major god among the Egyptians.34 Among 
the Greeks in Egypt, Serapis eventually had an additional role 
as the husband of Isis, and through that role gained popularity 
in the Greek and later Roman worlds.35 This opened up new 
temples and cults that needed staffed but also it presented a link 
between the Egyptian and Greek subjects. Greek subjects, despite 
some reluctance, eventually accepted Serapis and even endowed 
new temples for him.36 Through these temples both Greeks and 
Egyptians could worship the same god together. Inserting a deity 
into both religious traditions was one step towards unification of 
the Ptolemies’ Greek and Egyptian populations around a single 
identity. 
 Social mobility existed for those Egyptians who adapted 
to Ptolemaic rule. The Ptolemies brought the Greek language 
along with them. Greek rapidly supplanted Egyptian as the 
language of choice among the highest stratum of Ptolemaic 
society. Nowhere was this more prevalent than in the upper 
reaches of the bureaucracy.37 The Ptolemaic dynasty themselves 
were a bastion of Greek identity, out of twenty-two pharaohs only 
one, Cleopatra VII, the Cleopatra known for her escapades with 
Caesar and Anthony, learned Egyptian.38 The lack of effort on 
part of the Greeks to reach down is understandable as they mostly 
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constituted members of the upper or upper-middle classes. But 
while the Greeks did not reach down, the Egyptians could reach 
up.39 Learning Greek would give an Egyptian in the Ptolemaic 
state a chance for promotion and many Egyptians who learnt 
Greek adopted Greek names. Within one family of notaries in 
Pathyris, the earlier generations used Egyptian names while later 
generations used Greek names, despite the fact their knowledge 
of Greek was limited.40 Knowledge of Greek, as evident by that 
example, did not always indicate Greek ethnicity.41 This adoption 
of Greek names has led to continued confusion regarding the 
exact nature of the upper reaches of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy, 
where Greek names predominate.42 While it certainly may be true 
that the upper echelons of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy remained 
predominately Greek, the very fact that some Egyptians, by 
adopting Greek, were able to rise in the bureaucracy would have 
given a sense of agency and social mobility to the low-ranking civil 
servant. But social mobility could also instigate also nationalist 
sentiment among these and other rising middle-class Egyptians. 
 The Ptolemies actively used their founder’s connection 
with Alexander the Great to make a claim that Egypt was the 
successor to the Alexandrian empire. From the beginning of 
Ptolemaic rule there was an emphasis placed on connecting 
the Egyptians to Alexander, and by extension to the Ptolemies. 
The capture of Alexander’s body by Ptolemy I and its burial in 
Alexandria can be seen in this light.43 If the Egyptians could be 
made to feel as if they were part of Alexander’s empire, then the 
threat that they would rebel against the Ptolemies, a dynasty 
continually emphasizing its ties to Alexander, would be reduced. 
Even Ptolemy I’s original claim only to the title of satrap aligns 
with this reconfiguration of history.44 Egypt was portrayed as the 
Alexandrian empire, the Ptolemies were portrayed as simply the 
successors to Alexander, and Alexander himself was portrayed as 
an Egyptian. Also promoted was the myth of Sesostris, a warrior 
pharaoh who supposedly conquered Europe. The Sesostris myth 
was “used to console the national pride of the Egyptians [after] 
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a series of foreign conquests, [and it was] evidently intended to 
buttress their sagging national self-confidence and…national 
identity.”45 The myth is a reversal of Alexander’s conquests and 
by extension the Ptolemies’, but it emphasizes Egypt as the 
conqueror. Not only was Egypt Alexander’s empire, or what 
remained of it, but Egypt was portrayed as having a long history 
of conquering other peoples, including conquering Thrace and 
Scythia, two places quite close to Greece and Macedonia.46 This 
repainting of history to emphasize Egypt was, in effect, controlled 
nationalism by the Ptolemies. Since Egypt conquered Greece and 
Macedonia, or at least conquered peoples near such places, then 
the foreignness of the ruling stratum was not actually so foreign. 
By utilizing Egyptian nationalism and contorting it to suit their 
purposes the Ptolemies were able to strengthen their own reign.
 The Ptolemies tried to deemphasize ethnic differences 
between the Egyptians and the Greeks. It would be wrong to 
assert that Ptolemaic Egypt treated their Greek and Egyptian 
subjects equally, but the racialized distinctions between Egyptian 
and Greek were propagated by Greek immigrants. Ptolemaic 
Egypt was, in some regards, seen as a promised land by many 
Greeks, leading to Greek immigration into Egypt.47 Seeing 
the Greek settlers as colonists helps make light of the Greek 
racialization of the Egyptians, as the Greek settlers perpetuated 
a viewpoint reminiscent of colonialism in later millennia: the 
settlers in colonies tended to hold racist beliefs towards the natives 
in contrast to the patronizing but less racist beliefs espoused by 
the metropole and the central government. Given the extent the 
Ptolemies tried to collaborate with the Egyptian population, it 
seems doubtful the Ptolemies would have encouraged the racial 
divisions between the Greeks and Egyptians.48 Drawing racial 
distinctions between the Greeks and Egyptians would have 
worked against the Ptolemies and their need for a collaborative 
state with the Egyptians. Even as the Ptolemaic state suffered 
from uprisings from the reign of Ptolemy IV onward, the 
performance of the Ptolemaic ruler as a traditional Egyptian 
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pharaoh continued.49 If the Ptolemies had actively racialized 
the Egyptians it would have been logical for them to abandon 
the imagery of an Egyptian pharaoh. Yet this did not happen. 
Understanding the racialization of the Egyptians as being led by 
Greek settlers as opposed to the Ptolemaic administration solves 
this conundrum. 
EXPLAINING THE FALL
 Despite all these attempts and quite substantial 
collaboration and buy-in from the local population, Egyptian 
uprisings occurred. While the early Ptolemies faced no serious 
rebellions, this slowly changed.50 By the time of Ptolemy IV, who 
reigned between 221 and 204 B.C.E., the first uprising broke 
out.51 These rebellions became more common and more difficult to 
suppress as Ptolemaic rule plodded on.52 But these uprisings were 
closely related to environmental shocks, not directly by Ptolemaic 
policies.53 When volcanic eruptions caused fluctuations in Nile 
flooding or other environmental pressures, depending on the 
severity of the disruptions, rebellions often occurred. Eruptions 
around 246 BCE coincide with the recall of the recently crowned 
Ptolemy III from battle to Egypt to deal with revolts.54 Even the 
uprising by the newly-armed Egyptian troops after the Battle of 
A coin of the unlucky Ptolemy IV, a ruler who faced the 
first of many major uprisings which the Ptolemaic state 
were unable to suppress.
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Raphia  coincided directly with a disruption in the usual flow 
of the Nile caused by environmental fluctuations.55 While the 
role of phalanx-trained Egyptian troops in the uprising should 
not be underestimated, the fact the uprising corresponded with 
environmental changes hints at a connection. The Theban revolt 
of southern Egypt starting in 206 B.C.E. also aligned well with 
Nile fluctuations caused by volcanic activity.56 These and other 
examples of rebellions coinciding with environmental changes 
are too numerous to be ignored. However, rebellions caused 
ultimately by environmental changes were not new in Egypt. 
The history of Egypt prior to the arrival of the Ptolemies was 
littered with similar examples.57 Yet since these uprisings were a 
continual occurrence throughout Egyptian history, the inability 
of the Ptolemies to successfully put down these rebellions is 
notable and hints at deeper trouble underpinning Ptolemaic rule.
 The Ptolemaic state was weak. Collaboration with the 
native Egyptian population might have made Egypt easier to 
reign for the Ptolemies, but presented a problem when those 
Egyptians, upon whom the Ptolemies relied, rebelled. Co-opting 
the symbols, rituals, and practices of Egypt could not insulate the 
Ptolemies from what was endemic in Egypt, uprisings caused by 
environmental events. A strong centralized state would have been 
needed to deal with the uprisings environmental fluctuations 
brought, but a collaborationist state cannot be centralized. 
Collaboration requires the lower-level administrators to have 
significant autonomy and necessitates that the upper levels rely 
on the lower levels. This fundamentally undercut the Ptolemaic 
dynasty’s ability to exert control when uprisings occurred. 
Between Scylla and Charybdis, the Ptolemies had to either create 
a centralized state and risk continual uprisings immediately or 
create a collaborationist state and risk periodic uprisings due to 
factors outside their control. Given the choice they chose the 
latter. Through a weak state they founded their rule; through a 
weak state they lost their rule.




 The Ptolemaic state was centered on collaboration with 
the native population and Ptolemaic law was enforced by a 
broad swath of the Egyptian populace. The taxes were collected 
by Egyptians. Temples, supported by the Ptolemies, employed 
Egyptians and were a substantial presence in the lives of an 
average Egyptian. Opportunities for advancement existed to 
skillful Egyptians who adapted to their new Ptolemaic rulers. 
Myths told to Egyptians granted them nationalism and pride in 
their own agency. Ethnic and racial identifications were inherent, 
but were not promoted by the Ptolemies. Structures such as the 
ability to appeal legal cases, tax relief, support for the temples, 
possibilities for advancement, and the promotion of nationalism 
all worked to tie the people closer to the Ptolemaic state. But the 
features of the Ptolemaic state that allowed it to thrive, such as 
substantial collaboration with the Egyptian population within a 
decentralized administration, proved a weakness. Ultimately, the 
Egyptians did not rise in revolt because of what the Ptolemies 
did; rather, they rose because of what the Ptolemies could not 
control. Uprisings caused by environmental fluctuations were 
common throughout Egyptian history, but the decentralized 
and inherently weak collaborationist state of the Ptolemies made 
it unable to effectively respond to them. Collaboration and 
decentralization allowed the Ptolemies to rule without provoking 
uprisings, but factors outside of their control caused uprisings 
anyways. Through the collaborationist and decentralized state 
structures, albeit tolerant and empowering to the populace in 
normal times, the Ptolemies ultimately discovered the weakness 
in their reign.
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The Politics of Pride: Conservative Visions of American 
Nationalism in the Vietnam War Era
Anna Lisa Lowenstein
 The Vietnam War resulted in a military loss that forced 
Americans to reassess their notions of nationalism. The pacifist 
anti-war movement evoked deep emotional responses from 
both the political right and political left. These responses, 
compounded by the tense economic and social pressures of the 
1960s and 1970s, motivated the left to reject nationalism. In 
contrast, the right embraced American pride and villainized 
the anti-war movement. Using documents, news and popular 
media, and literature from 1962 to 1986, this thesis argues that 
nationalism was essential in binding together three disparate 
groups of American conservatives in order to create a political 
coalition. These groups—the white working class, intellectuals, 
and far-right extremists—coalesced despite their varying social 
and economic needs and different visions of nationhood. The 
result was increased success for Republican politicians and a 
legitimization of conservatism in the public eye. 
The Unity of the Roses: How the Marriage of Henry VII 
and Elizabeth of York Created the Foundation of the Tudor 
Political Identity
Lorenza Colagrossi
 This thesis examines how Henry VII utilized his marriage 
to Elizabeth of York to create the foundation of the Tudor 
political identity. It will focus on the use of visual imagery to 
create national unity and justify his place on the throne. Henry’s 
reign was marked by a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, he 
sought to celebrate his wife’s Yorkist lineage and the legitimacy it 
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provided for his rule. On the other hand, he wanted to emphasize 
that he was king in his own right. Through his propaganda and 
symbolism, a new image of kingship was born. The use of visual 
imagery to depict Henry extended beyond the crown and into 
the nobility. Henry ascended to power following a turbulent 
period of civil war. The conflict left no member of the nobility 
unscarred. Through visual imagery such as genealogical scrolls 
and stained-glass windows, they expressed their sentiments about 
Henry. These images demonstrate how their allegiances during 
the Wars of the Roses impacted how they saw their new king. 
This thesis compares and contrasts how Henry VII and his son, 
Henry VIII, depicted themselves and their reigns. Unlike his 
father, Henry VIII had a legitimate claim to the throne and did 
not rely on symbolism and other means to justify his position as 
king. This important distinction between the two monarchs was 
reflected in the unique ways they depicted themselves. 
Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America: A Comparative 
Study of New York City and Philadelphia Politics
Justin Greenman
 This thesis examines the similarities and differences 
between the politics of New York City and Philadelphia during 
the American Civil War. As the war progressed, both cities 
diverged, with Philadelphia existing throughout politically 
stable and relatively politically united, while New York City for 
much of the war was divided and prone to violence and political 
extremism. The central question of this thesis, therefore, has been 
why did Philadelphia and New York City diverge so sharply and 
if and how did conceptions of loyalty and disloyalty play a role? 
My thesis is unique in focusing on how the politics of each city 
were defined by a conflict over defining loyalty to the Union and 
the war effort, definitions that evolved as the war progressed. 
In the end, one’s loyalty and disloyalty could not be judged by 
one’s religion, partisan identification, or even political allies. It 
127     Senior Honors Thesis Abstracts 
Honors Thesis Abstracts
especially could not be judged by one’s rhetoric, which was often 
vague at best and deceitful of one’s true intentions at worst. In 
fact, if there is one conclusion that this paper easily makes, it is 
that there were no universally agreed upon, or even mostly agreed 
upon, definitions of what constituted loyalty and disloyalty, only 
subjective opinions altered by time and animated by the politics 
of each city. 
‘A Warmth of Feeling that the Lies of our Enemies Will 
Never Eradicate:’ The Battle of Cable Street and the Evolving 
Memory of Anti-Fascism in Britain, 1931-1949
Sam Orloff
 Whereas the function of nostalgia in right-wing politics 
is readily apparent in contemporary society, nostalgia on the 
political left is less self-evident. To explore the role of nostalgia 
in left-wing politics, this thesis considers the evolving memory 
and meaning of the Battle of Cable Street, a 1936 clash in which 
anti-fascists descended on the streets of London’s East End to 
block Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BUF) from 
provocatively marching through the heavily Jewish district. The 
events at Cable Street are further contextualized by charting 
the trajectory of the broader anti-fascist discourse in Britain 
from the rise of the BUF in the early 1930s to Britain’s postwar 
reconstruction under Prime Minister Clement Attlee. In doing 
so, it is also possible to identify the tension between the left-wing 
internationalism and the demands of domestic politics, as well as 
the nature of the relationship between Britain’s Labour Party and 
the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in the 1930s and 
1940s.
